On The Political Economy of the Future:
The Post Conflict Sudan is A New Sudan
Sidgi Kaballo
October 2001
Exclusive mafhoum
“Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point however is to change it”, the eleventh thesis, Marx Theses on Feuerbach.
Introduction
This paper argues that this conference by focusing on the question of post conflict Sudan is setting itself the task of discussing the agenda for a new Sudan. It argues that the post conflict Sudan and the old or current Sudan are contradictions in terms. The post conflict Sudan is a negation of the old Sudan. To achieve a post-conflict Sudan we have to achieve the agenda for a new Sudan. It is impossible to end the war in the Sudan and achieve permanent peace without accepting the agenda for a new Sudan. Even if peace is achieved without accepting and implementing such agenda for a new Sudan, the war will start again. A permanent peace in the Sudan is only achievable by negating the old and current Sudan because the causes of the war are structural and implicit in the socio-economic structure of the old/current Sudan. However, the paper realizes the fact that the new Sudan is carried in the womb of the old and the forces that will create the new are the product of the old Sudan.
The paper argues that the forces of the New Sudan are the product of the social struggle and the economic and social change both on the national, regional and international levels.
The paper attempts to focus on the negation of the crisis, on the agenda of the new Sudan. Instead of dealing with the symptom of uneven development for example it campaigns for a program for even development, or instead of discussing the dictatorship and violation of human rights, it provokes the need for a democratic constitution and democratic state of the New Sudan. In short the paper deals with the political economy of the future. However, that political economy of the future is based on previous works of the author on the political economy of crisis in the Sudan (1).
The New Old Dichotomy
While the new is to come or to be made to happen, the old is either here or it was there. The old is reality or history, the new is an imagination, hope, program, agenda or future.
The old Sudan and the current Sudan have things in common and hence we will use the word old to mean also the current or present. The Sudanese crisis is built in the structure of the old Sudan, partially as a colonial heritage and partially as a failure of transformation due to the structure of the socio-economic power that governed Sudan since independence.
General Outline of the Crisis
In a previous work the general crisis facing the Sudan is identified as an organic crisis of transformation (2). I have argued that the transformation crisis has faced the Sudan since her independence. The main reason for the crisis was that the problems of transforming the inherited colonial economy and structures, which had risen to the national agenda since then, have not been resolved.
I have also argued that particular political and economic crises had occurred over the period 1956-1985. Despite the distinguishable features of those particular crises there were several other common features. These features constituted general political and economic trends that, in their turn had characterised the general crisis since independence in 1956.
The study of the colonial political and economic legacy provided an important component of that previous as it reflected on the process of the articulation of the capitalist mode of production and the pre-capitalist modes of production, which had prevailed in the country before the re-conquest of the Sudan in 1898. Political, institutional and market articulation affected the nature of the Sudanese economy, the class structure and class struggle. The nature of the colonial state as an authoritarian and relatively autonomous state left its features in the political economy of the country.
In that previous work I have studied the historical development of the post-colonial state. The colonial heritage of the country and the concrete class struggle had given the post-colonial state its nature and constituted its crisis. In revealing the nature of the post- colonial state a ruling power bloc is identified. That power bloc was composed of the religious and tribal aristocracy, the bourgeoisie and the military and civilian bureaucracy.
The crisis of the post-colonial state, has been argued in that study, is a crisis of hegemony. The failure of the power bloc, a fraction or a class of it to establish its hegemony is the main cause of the crisis of the state and the particular form of that crisis: the military-civilian governments alterance in power.
The ruling power bloc, mainly empowered and enriched through the political and economic articulation carried by the colonial state, had basic interests in the continuation of inherited institutions of articulation of the capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. The power bloc was divided in the politics of the spoil distribution using religious sectarianism both as clientele linkage and ideological cover. Meanwhile an urban democratic movement and several regional movements challenged the authoritarian tendencies of the power bloc, which were aimed at preventing the dominated classes from having a say in the future of the country. The ruling power bloc was not able to 'deliver the goods', because delivering them required a deep transformation in the legacy of the colonial economy. The colonial economy was not established to meet the ever-increasing requirements of the population. It was an export-oriented, linked to the international world market through the export-import of commodities and capital.
I have also argued that the crisis of the economy has its basic causes in the patterns of agricultural production both in its irrigated and rain-fed sub-sectors. Irrigated agriculture is characterised by a rigid and static institutional articulation that prevented the development of production relations to match the relative development in the productive forces. In the rain-fed agriculture, with the exception of the large-scale capitalist mechanised farm, the articulation through exchange led to the spread of capitalist relations of production, but in contrast to the irrigated agriculture, without the development of productive forces. Both sectors are strongly linked to the international capitalist market, a link that has enabled the export of economic surplus, the import of devastating effects of international depressions and the limited effects of booms. Considering the dominant role of agricultural production in the Sudanese economy, it is found that the crisis of agricultural production explains most of the other features of the economic crisis.
The expansion of the economy without radically transforming the rigid level of the articulation inherited from the colonial era had resulted in changes in the forces of production and the class structure. The changes in productive forces and class structure aggravated the crisis situation and made the question of radical transformation more urgent and vital.
The failure of transforming the economy was accompanied by a failure in managing it. The management of the economy during the colonial period was based on the vast powers of the authoritarian colonial state. Coercion became central in the management of the colonial economy. The post-colonial state's ability of using coercion was legitimately limited and the urban democratic movement and the effective regional forces, especially the Southern Sudanese, had challenged its tendency towards authoritarianism.
The politics of ethnic and regional conflicts were closely related to uneven development of the country and the composition of the ruling power bloc as Northern and of Arab Islamic culture. It was in the politics of ethnic and regional conflicts that coercion was widely used against the Southern people. The civil war, which struck the country twice, has contributed to the crisis of the post-colonial state.
The crises of the state and the economy strengthened each other through the politics of spoils and the failure to deliver the goods expected by the population.
Within this context the previous contribution studied the particular 1973-85 crisis. The particular crisis is found to be a continuation of the general crisis despite its specific features. The military-bureaucratic fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie, which dominated the state during the 1973-85 periods, failed to establish its hegemony and ruled the country through an authoritarian state. The failure to build an alliance with the urban democratic movement in the North between 1969 and the July 1971 coup d'ètat was a turning point in the history of the Nimeiri regime. Between 1971 and 1977, the regime failed to incorporate or work out an alliance with the traditional political parties and the Islamic Charter Front. The National Reconciliation of 1977 did not reach its logical conclusion by widening the base of the regime. The promulgation of Islamic Sharia Law in 1983 did not promote the regime's quest for legitimacy and remained to be an additional tool of repression.
Nimeiri's greatest achievement in the quest for legitimacy was the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended the first civil war in 1972. The Agreement failed in application because it did not provide for a fair share in the distribution of wealth and its attempt to establish a fair distribution of power was haunted by the contradiction between the authoritarian state in the centre and the semi-democratic state in the South. By 1983, when the second civil war started in the South, the regime had lost its legitimacy in the South.
Despite being a continuation of the general economic crisis, the particular crisis of 1973-85 was a crisis of simple and extended reproduction that resulted from specific policies of the Nimeiri regime. The regime deepened the general trend when it failed to transform the structure of the economy. Despite its expansion, the economy remained an unevenly developed export-oriented economy with weak inter-sector and inter-regional linkages liable to be severely affected by international crises and moderately benefiting from international booms. Between 1973 and 1985 the economy became more unevenly developed in contrast to all the claims of the regime about regional governments. The failure to maintain and utilise the existing producing capacities of the economy led to the decline of yields of agriculture and the productivity of industrial and services sectors. As a result, the country failed to maintain the previous levels of exports and its imports bill increased drastically bringing the trade balance and with it the balance of payment into great deficit. The economy also suffered from the failure to complete the construction of the new project or to optimally utilise the new added capacities. Instead of compensating the decline in output and revenues due to the lack of maintenance and repairs, the new projects added to the problems of the Sudanese economy by increasing the national debt. Unable to serve its debts and to pay the bill of the increasing imports, the Sudan turned to the IMF for financial rescue. To qualify for the IMF extended facilities, the Nimeiri implemented an austerity programme that let to the deterioration of the standard of living of the majority causing a further decline in the legitimacy of the regime and its overthrow in April 1985.
The Current Crisis and the Continuation of the Old Sudan Crisis
The authoritarian state of the military Islamic fraction of the new bourgeoisie attempted for the third time in the post-colonial history of the Sudan to destroy the urban democratic movement. At the same time it attempted to dismantle and replace the old political parties representing the power bloc that ruled the Sudan from 1954 to 1989. Yet it failed to produce an ideological and political discourse and an effective political organisation capable of rallying the masses. The Islamic ideology of the fundamentalist failed in rallying the masses around the regime. The new political organisation established by the regime (the National Congress) aimed to widen the base of support of the regime to include people from outside the Islamic movement. Instead the Islamic movement itself is divided in two main fractions and a disillusioned number of members and supporters. Hegemony is about concession, acceptance and compromises. It is gaining leadership through a multiple actions including ideological political and economic discourse, programs, policies and actual benefits that make the majority of the society accepts voluntarily the leadership of the class or group. The new military by taking power by a coup made it difficult or impossible to establish hegemony. The violation of human rights, which was the main characteristic of the regime, negates the concept of hegemony itself. The unprecedented use of violence and coercion by the regime in the history of modern Sudan contributed to deepening the hegemony crisis rather than solving it.
It is no use to be the sole actor in the theatre when the audience starts leaving. The question remains always whether the audience is interested on the play or not. In a regime established by a coup d’etat, legitimacy would not be gained by exposing the mistakes, corruption and bad policies of the dismantled regime. The masses need material evidence in terms of actual benefits to be convinced that the new regime worth their support. Instead the Islamists’ regime through out its history was providing promises about future benefits. But these benefits are never realised. Its legitimacy eroded further as corruption became evident and the economic crisis deepened. Poverty is increasing and famines and hunger are dominating.
The common feature between the current regime and all the regimes of old Sudan is the failure to establish hegemony. The failure to establish hegemony is an important element in the general crisis in the Sudan. The state power remained within the hands of the Arab Islamic fractions. Uneven developed continued and deepened and the population of marginalized areas suffered from civil war, famine and increasing poverty. Instead of resolving the problems of power sharing and wealth distribution, the current regime has changed the civil war into a religious one.
General Characteristics of the Old Sudan
Without repeating what is said about the general crisis, let us try to outline the general characteristic that make the old Sudan what it is and that are responsible for the build in crisis.
1- The concentration of power and wealth in the ruling power bloc of Arab-Islamic origins: This characteristics is responsible both for the military-civilian alterance in government and hence the confiscation of democracy and human rights and the civil war. This concentration of power is an obstacle to achieving hegemony and hence ruling by consensus and acceptance. It is responsible for the weak and deteriorating legitimacy of the state and all political systems whether democratic or military. This is especially true when the ruling power club (with its different alliances and regrouping) failed in producing a hegemonic culture, ideology or political discourse.
2- The rigid articulation of mode of production in Sudan which is responsible both for the economic crisis and the tendency for authoritarian rule and hence, the confiscation of democracy and human rights. As there are elements of change within the economy and production forces, the rigid articulation is responsible both of the deterioration of national resources and the instability of the state (political instability). The rigid articulation is also responsible to the continuation of the uneven development of the economy and hence the uneven distribution of wealth and power. That makes it also responsible for the re-occurrences of civil war and its spread from South-North to other regions.
3- The cultural domination of the centre which is a result of power and wealth concentration on one hand and their results of uneven development and the confiscation of democracy and human rights on the other.
For the illustration of these characteristics of the old Sudan see figure No. 1
The Conditions for Building a New Sudan
As we said before that the new Sudan is the negation of the old one. The conditions for the new Sudan are to change the three main characteristic of the old one. This is an organic process. It is not a formal one. However, the formal change is important for the organic change to happen. The formal change begins by accepting the conditions for a new Sudan and planning or having a specific program to achieve. It is not enough to write a democratic secular constitution to achieve the even and just distribution of power and wealth. However, you cannot achieve that aim without a democratic secular constitution that provides for and protect human rights of all citizens and equality before the law. That constitution needs to provide for the distribution of power at the centre and on the regions both functionally and substantially allowing for power sharing at the centre and real power distribution at the regions. The functional power distribution will play the role of checks, balance and protection. At the centre of this functional distribution of power are the independent judiciary and the strong parliament where specific majority is set for constitution and basic laws amendments. An example of the latter is either a rigid constitution that requires large majority, three quarters for example, or a partial rigid constitution that require such large majority for specific chapters (for example the chapters on human rights or powers of central and regional governments). The Constitution needs to be explicit about cultural rights as a condition to alter the existing cultural domination. It also needs to be explicit about the distribution of wealth and economic rights of the regions.
The formal process needs to be substantiated by a positive action program that aims at bringing equality and balance in civil service, diplomatic service, army and police. However, the most important change is the transformation of the economy to a modern agro-industrial economy that is evenly developed and has strong linkages between its sectors and regions. The latter is a base for a united Sudan. The unity of the national market could not be established in a distorted economy that the linkages among its sectors and regions are weak. The economic integration and interdependency of the regions and sectors is the base of a united market and a united country. Even development needs a positive action program to bring the level of the development of production forces and the distribution of services and infrastructure to a national average level.
Figure No. 2 outlines the new Sudan Project.
Forces of the New Sudan
The forces of new Sudan or the forces that have interest in building new Sudan are product of the struggle within the old Sudan. In social struggle classes, social and cultural groups as well as individuals do not adopt single everlasting position. The stands of these groups change as the conditions change. There are multiple of conditions. Some of them concern the objective development of the class or social or cultural group (their size and number, their wealth, their position in the economy or the social and cultural life). Others concern the subjective development of these groups (their self consciousness, their organisation, their leadership). There are also external conditions, external to the specific class or group or external to the whole socio-economic structure. An example of the former is the change of other classes and social groups and their roles in society, while the example for the latter is regional and international changes.
In a recent book I am still writing I found that there are significant changes in the class structure in the Sudan. Some classes like the religious and tribal aristocracy lost their economic base and have been absorbed in the capitalist class. The capitalist class has gone through significant changes since independence. The number and composition of the working class has also changed. The ethnic and regional cleavage of the class structure has changed. Regional movements themselves have changed. Social movements like women movement for example have also changed. New movement such environmental movements are growing.
All these changes affected political parties and political movements.
Among all these the forces of the new Sudan are growing. Let us for example ask the question why the Sudanese capitalist class has interest in the new Sudan? Objectively such a program is the only way for peaceful capitalist development in the Sudan. Capitalist development in the Sudan needs natural resources and united market. Both could not be obtained without peace. Natural resources including land, oil and gas, water and minerals could not be tapped on economically without peace. The alternative is what happening now in oil fields, which means investment under fire, using oppression and genocide and involving great risks in capital and human resources. This is not the optimal solution for profit maximisation. Capital needs a national market. This could not be achieved while the country is under war. War might help in primitive accumulation of capital by displacing people who will find no alternative but to sell their labour force, but that would always be a temporary measure. Capital, in a non-arms- industry economy, cannot afford continuing the war because it is a shift of financial resources from investment and consumption to destruction. The war costs one million dollar per day to meet just the military operations. There are other costs as a loss of revenue, new expenditure on displaced people etc. International capital will not like to bear the burden of war-created famines indefinitely. The price of permanent peace is justice and democracy.
The forces of the new Sudan are the majority of Sudanese people who aspire for peace, democracy and development of the united Sudan.
Notes
(1) See the authors PhD thesis submitted to the University of Leeds “The Political Economy of crisis in the Sudan” 1994.
(2) See; Sidgi Kaballo (1994), The Political Economy of Crisis in the Sudan, A PhD thesis presented to the University of Leeds 1994.
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