Sudan between international credibility and hope in the ideal style of men
Bashir Al-Bakri
- Quoted from Al-Rai Al-Aam newspaper -
At Khartoum Airport, for the first time, an agreement was reached between its government and the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his assistants, on the terms of a temporary settlement of the Darfur tragedy, after a field visit to the conflict sites in western Sudan, which was preceded by another visit by the Secretary of State of the United States, who then danced at the Spanish meeting.
This surprising settlement for the international community, which was prepared for another game. This settlement raises many observations in terms of the parties, in terms of scope, and in terms of the legal wording. It undoubtedly does not take literally Chapter Six of the United Nations Charter, nor Chapter Seven. Perhaps what “Hammerskjöld” intended in the name of Chapter Six and a Half is therefore a settlement of a special kind in which it is not known who emerged victorious, and its international custom is surrounded by ambiguity, but it gave space for thought to all stakeholders.
As for our second observation, this settlement is of a temporary, multi-objective nature. It gives the government of Sudan time that may reach three months to disarm the “Janjaweed” and indeed all other illegal armed militias. It also gives an “experiment” in how to monitor the ceasefire. It also gives the African Union an opportunity to hold a negotiating meeting between the conflicting parties in the capital of the “others,” which reminds us of the Addis Ababa Agreement, and once again the ball returns to the African neighborhood, and is forbidden to the Arab neighborhood.
As for the third observation, this settlement is not of value. It does not completely exonerate the government and does not negate the accusations of the international press, which focused on violating human rights and ethnic cleansing and tend to accuse the “Janjaweed.” However, it does not condemn the other party to the conflict and does not require it to submit to a ceasefire and attend conflict resolution negotiations. Moreover, this settlement does not give the “international dimension” its due nor the responsibilities of all the democratic forces in Sudan.
As for the third observation, this settlement does not prevent the continuation of the investigation and investigation into the causes and motives of the conflict and its treatment and treatment of its effects, whether the matter is from the government of Sudan represented by the investigation committee headed by Mawlana Dafallah Haj Yusuf, the Chief Justice, nor the preparation of the comprehensive conference that Mr. Izz al-Din al-Sayyid is preparing for. On the other hand, this settlement did not stipulate preventing the United States and the anti-Sudan lobby from preparing the matter for presentation to the Security Council, especially since “Danforth,” the hero of the agreement, is now responsible for his punishment. The well-known south.
All of this is happening in an international atmosphere dominated by ambiguity, whether what is happening in Iraq and its questionable national governance, or what is happening in Palestine and Israel’s intransigent role in it. So how is the Sudanese issue and the Darfur issue intended to be dominated by an atmosphere of confidence, in the spread of a new culture of unattainable peace?
After that, the man who assumed the representation of the United Nations and is its Secretary-General was the one who was repeating and preparing the development and role of the United Nations for peacekeeping or even peacemaking. Years ago, he also commissioned his friend and assistant, Lakhdar Brahimi, to prepare a report to develop the concept of peacekeeping and peacemaking and the role of the United Nations in all of this.
The report recommended a new concept that addresses the roots of the problems and works on what is called preventive diplomacy. It addresses the political, economic and humanitarian dimensions of intervention and does not limit it to purely military intervention, although it does not exclude it. It organizes and develops it and creates a new institution from it that goes beyond Chapter Six or even Chapter Seven, pending a comprehensive amendment to the Charter.
As for the fourth observation, it is that the credibility of implementing this settlement is not limited to finding a permanent solution to the Darfur tragedy...this solution that can only be made by the people of Sudan and the people of Darfur themselves, but the credibility this time will have the greatest impact on the implementation of the six Naivasha agreements and protocols, which are being negotiated in a final stage.
Sudan has put itself before a difficult test of credibility that includes all of its future and all of its unity, and is not limited to the south or even Darfur, but includes what may develop from other sides. This credibility is the only bridge that Sudan crosses from the stage of instability to stability and development.
As for the final observation, it is that we would have liked for all the democratic forces in the country to participate in this settlement, even if temporary, whose absence we notice, as well as the absence of Mr. Leader Al-Mirghani and Mr. Imam Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi. We do not know whether the matter was presented to them, but we know that rights are taken and sought for and not given.
Finally, how much we would have liked Egypt to bear witness to the closeness of this settlement. The absence of its leader and president, Hosni Mubarak, due to the illness that befell him, hurts us all, and we have no greater wish than for him to return safely to his country, free from all harm, to play the role he is accustomed to. It is true that what is required of Sudan is great “credibility” and proof of a new culture of peace, but what is also required of men, especially from the United Nations, is a new approach that absolves the international community of bias and division.