Security arrangements for separation September 28, 2003
D. Suleiman Muhammad Al-Diblo
The entire Sudanese people, especially their diaspora abroad, have followed what happened and is taking place in the peace negotiations, with passion and apprehension, inspired by the hope of stability and peace that will restore to the country much of its wealth and energies and stop the flow of blood of its people, which has long fertilized the forests of its south. Yes, everyone has a solution to the problem that destroyed everything that existed and stopped the wheel of growth and progress until we became among the last of the last, lacking the most basic necessities of life. Because peace is a cherished hope and both sides of the war acknowledge that there is no other option, each of us is very keen to fill all the gaps that make peace attempts fail.
Although we have reached a stage where we are optimistic about any claim of peace, the framework that was announced in Naivasha on 9/25/2003 regarding security arrangements has, unfortunately, dashed all hopes for achieving peace. I have read the terms of this agreement from more than one source, and I followed the news agencies, and I am hopeful that I will find in one of them something that dispels the fear I felt about the agreement. Unfortunately, all sources confirm what I read and heard.
I do not want to swim against the current, as I am not good at swimming at all. However, the sense of nationalism dictates that we should not be afraid to say what is in the country’s interest, and because this agreement is historic in all senses, and there is a lot of good and bad in history, it is necessary to highlight its virtues as well as the disadvantages it contains.
A- It is recommended in agreement
* The first virtue is the frank recognition by both sides of the conflict of the futility of war and fighting, and that peace and negotiation alone are the civilized way out for resolving the dispute. He praises Colonel John Garang for that telephone initiative by Lieutenant General Omar al-Bashir, in which he expressed his peaceful intentions and his aspiration to return to his family and neighbors in Haj Yusuf, and he praises Lieutenant General al-Bashir and his deputy for the same feeling.
* The second is to express a firm desire to stop all forms of hostilities and fighting, and to strive diligently to agree on the remaining issues in the files of disagreement, as stated in (Ceasefire 2).
* The absence of the Abyei region in the agreement prompts us to make two observations. The first is: within the framework of the concessions to reach an agreement, the movement was convinced of Abyei’s dependency on the north because it was decided within the 1956 borders. However, at the same time, it hedged by including the Nuba Mountains region, which is more intrusive into the north. The second is that the movement sees that it is a settled southern issue and there is no need to include it in the agreement. In any case, with the confirmation of the 56 secession borders, this document has confirmed the dependency of the Abyei area to the north.
B- Defective agreement
As for the disadvantages of the agreement, they are many, if not all of what was stated in its provisions. We will summarize them as follows:
* Paragraph (1-A), in my opinion, is exclusionary. It came to confirm that the agreement is partial between the SPLM and its equipment in the SPLA, represented by Colonel John Garang, and the National Congress Party, represented by the First Representative, Mr. Ali Osman, away from the Sudanese people, their political forces, and their institutions. In this capacity, he is like the Khartoum Agreement with Riek Machar, and the Fashoda Agreement with Dr. Lam Akol. The agreement also left the way open for others who carry weapons in the south, west, east, and perhaps in the north and center to incite and fan the fire of sedition.
* Paragraphs (1- B, C, D) came to undermine the Sudanese Armed Forces and their role in preserving the nation. If the intention was sincere, it would have been necessary for both parties to agree to the complete integration of all forces, not only the forces of the two parties to the agreement, but rather the integration must include all factions bearing arms, as well as military personnel who have been subjected to separation and displacement, and only in this way it establishes an exit from the spiral of war.
* Paragraph (3 - Redeployment of forces) is in fact an explicit agreement, confirmation and guarantee of the separation of the south while keeping the three regions under negotiation. What is saddening is the marginalization of the role of the armed forces, which are supposed to represent the entire country, and which consist of all the tribes of Sudan. How can their role be reduced and equated with the forces of the Popular Movement, when they do not support all the people of South Sudan? If the intentions were truly sincere, there would be no need to redeploy, but rather to integrate the forces and formulate their composition into a national army concerned with what was stated in (4-B, the tasks of the joint forces).
* As for what was stated in (4-C, the size and distribution of the deployment forces), it is a smart circumvention by the movement on the clause of redeploying its forces to the borders of the south, by keeping all its forces in the south while adding 3,000 in the Nuba Mountains at a time when, according to the Nuba Mountains Agreement, stability and peace have actually been achieved there, and the spirit of harmony has returned among the tribes of the region; Another three thousand in southern Blue Nile, and half this number in Khartoum. I am certain that these arrangements will be the spark that will set off this agreement, even if we assume good intentions.
* What was mentioned in (7-A: The status of other armed groups in Sudan) is an embodiment of the spirit of exclusion that this agreement brought about. The phrase “no groups are allowed...” in which the two parties to the agreement restrict what they have permitted to themselves from the other groups. And the phrase “not allowed” here means that the agreement between the Popular Movement and the First Deputy is a strategic partnership agreement that aims to defeat any opposition to them. The question is, which party will confront such groups if they do not agree to engage in it? Is it the SPLM army and the northern army combined, or was it agreed that the SPLM would take care of its opponents in the south, and the government would take care of those who opposed it in the north? Or will such tasks be assigned to the joint forces in the south and north? Or was this paragraph put in the agreement to be a means for both parties to disavow it whenever required, and everyone knows that the two parties to the agreement have no authority over the other factions that have allied with them in the past.
Conclusion
Despite the firm desire to achieve a state of peace and stability as a mechanism that enables us to grow and develop, what was stated in this agreement does not in any way embody the aspirations of the people of Sudan, and I fear that this agreement is merely concessions to announce an agreement under the Sudan Peace Law. My greatest fear is that this agreement will be a maneuver by both parties to weaken the other, as we have become accustomed to in the past. If the intentions were truly pure, as was announced in the press conferences and at Khartoum airport yesterday, it would have been hoped that the agreement would embody the security arrangements and clearly pave the way for the unity of Sudan and not to exclude others. What we expected was that the security arrangements agreement would establish real armed forces representing all the people of Sudan, away from the quotas and the exclusion of others. We expected a complete integration of all the fighting factions in the country, and for their leader to be one of the soldiers known for their purity and purity, and they are many in the sidewalk from the south and the north. We were expecting a sincere call of brotherhood to others in which he would confirm that the signing of any agreement would not take place except in their presence and in their presence. We were hoping that the First Deputy would return to Khartoum and return to Naivasha with representatives from the successive and opposition parties inside, and we were hoping that Colonel John Garang would go and return with representatives from his struggle comrades. Only then can the Sudanese citizen be reassured that the agreement is an agreement and not a deal, and there are many such agreements in our modern history.
Despite all these negatives, we cling to the hope that this agreement will bridge the gap of estrangement and separation and stop the bloodshed of the people of Sudan. We hope that the day will come when everyone will regret the millions of people of this country whose lives were lost, and this regret will be translated into building a country that has all the elements of development so that it will be an example to be emulated, and we have an example in the civil war in Nigeria and America.
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