COMMENT ON MAIN THEME
Mahgoub El-Tigani
1) Machekos Peace Protocols are de facto enforceable having been tediously negotiated and internationally guaranteed by the influential IGAD and the US-led Troika. Both negotiators are hard liners. That the government surrendered to the right to self determination, 50 percent share in wealth and large sharing in power within a new system of separated government branches (especially the Judiciary) is a historical breakthrough. Question is: would it be possible to forego all these agreements without very drastic collapse in the country's national, regional, and international radius? That certainly means a brutal uncontrollable war. Do we expect a military take over or an Intifada backed by some faithful military?! The brutality of the ruling junta dangerously challenge this possibility.That is why writer says the Machekos/Naivasha Peace Protocols are de facto applicable.
2) Yes, Machekos is quite suitable for application in the other regions that indeed share with the South more similarities than differences with respect to economic underdevelopment, ethnic and cultural identifications, etc. To expedite consistency, amendments must be thoughtfully worked via a National Constitutional Conference that should accommodate on equal basis all Sudanese parties, trades unions, and the other civil society groups. Here, the NDA must assume full unity; The Umma must join the NDA without hesitation as a unified consolidated leadership, and the NDA Leadership Council must stop accepting new members only on the basis of gun acquisition; the unions, women organizations, and professional groups struggle with thought and organizational skills the NDA obviously lacks. If all armed groups occupy leadership seats in the NDA, it is indeed disrespectful as well as unpractical to block out civil society groups from effective participation in the opposition activity. This obviously is the reason why Intifadah is not a foreseeable option despite valid theoretical assumptions.
3) Amendments are necessary as well as quite possible. These include restructuring of the legislative body of the Interim Parliament as the most strategic governance tool to enable the opposition to effectively participate in the next transition. We must remember: a good opposition is as important as a good government is. Other necessary amendments should include restructuring the national army to well represent the diversity of the country and the sensitive power relations between center-region (not only South-North).
I will return, if necessary, with more elaboration.
Thanks for this timely debate.