After signing the peace agreement
Between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
Will peace truly prevail throughout Sudan?!
Najm al-Din Karam Allah
Stopping the war is one of the biggest positives of the agreement Stopping the war is one of the biggest positives of the agreement
Bilateral agreement and marginalization of other political forces
The dual agreement and its repercussions on the various powers
Self-determination and the outcome of national unity
Reservations and opposition from the extremist Islamic movement
The future of the agreement and the prospects for resolving the Sudanese problem
The world stands in anticipation of the final signing of the peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement led by John Garang, after the signing of the final agreement protocols in the Kenyan resort of Naivasha in April of this year, which concluded painstaking negotiations that continued for several years.
In light of the wide welcome by the Sudanese political forces, and the regional and international blessing for concluding this agreement, represented by the IGAD countries in addition to the American side, and the participation of the European side, represented by the group of IGAD “friends” countries, the same question arises: Will this agreement concluded between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement be the beginning of the end of the armed conflict in Sudan, which has continued for long decades in which it has depleted the country’s wealth and human and economic resources, or will it be another unsuccessful attempt like other attempts? Which has been done before?
To answer this question, in order for us to predict the success or failure of this agreement, we must analyze its most important positives and negatives, the weak points that may lead to its relapse in the future, in addition to the internal and external factors that may affect its success or failure, and the regional and global roles in this issue.
Stopping the war is one of the biggest positives of the agreement Stopping the war is one of the biggest positives of the agreement
It is known that the most important achievements of the peace agreement that will be signed between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement is stopping the brutal war that has lasted more than half a century, destroyed hundreds of thousands of Sudanese people from the south and north, displaced millions from their villages and homes, and caused the waste of the country's resources and goods, which could have provided the people of Sudan with goodness and prosperity.
So when it comes to stopping the war and stopping the bloodshed, it is not permissible to argue and debate about it at all, and whoever argues or discusses about it does not know what war means, what destruction and devastation means, or he may not be aware of the status of the human soul and the dignity of man himself, or he may have other interests in the continuation of the war.
However, stopping the war and bloodshed depends on all parties adhering to their commitments. It is known that commitment to pledges is often much more difficult than the negotiation battle itself, because the negotiation battle is a struggle with the other party and its ability to negotiate and dialogue, while commitment to pledges is a struggle with oneself, self-interests, and the amount of trust towards the other party.
If we look at this agreement from a purely practical perspective, we find in it many gaps and weaknesses that affect the extent of its success in the future, and also affect the ability of the parties signing it to adhere to the pledges contained in it, not to mention the long-term strategic and political perspective.
Bilateral agreement and marginalization of other political forces
The first flaw in this agreement is that it was built on a bilateral basis, that is, between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, and the other political, civil, religious, and other groups of Sudanese society did not participate in it. This may weaken the strength of the agreement and make commitment to it limited to the parties that signed it, and they are parties as strong as they are, but they are not all the parties concerned.
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that some consultations took place with Sudanese parties outside the scope of the bilateral composition of the agreement, but the role of these parties was very secondary and only rose to the level of observer in the negotiations, and they did not have any influence on the content or even form of the agreement.
These consultations were represented by a visit by a delegation from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement to Khartoum, headed by Commander Pagan Amum and the spokesman for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, Yasser Arman, during which the delegation met with various political forces and party leaders, including opposition parties, where everyone stressed the necessity of Sudan's unity and the involvement of all political forces in the peace process.
In addition, the SPLM conducted other consultations with opposition political parties outside Sudan, which fall under the banner of the National Democratic Rally, and some of its cadres contributed as advisors to the SPLM in the various rounds of negotiations.
As for the Khartoum government, an important meeting took place between Muhammad Othman al-Mirghani, head of the opposition National Rally, and Ali Othman Muhammad Taha, the first deputy prime minister of the Sudanese government, in Jeddah, from which a joint statement was issued [click to view the text of the statement], which was adopted and approved by the forces of the National Rally after that. [See Suleiman Diplo and a critical view of the Jeddah Agreement]. See Solomon Diplo and a critical view of the Jeddah Agreement
However, all of these talks and consultations did not result in any real participation of the various Sudanese political forces in drafting the agreement, and their aim was only to save face or beautify the form or framework of the bilateral agreement.
The dual agreement and its repercussions on the various powers
The failure to involve the various Sudanese political forces, especially the northern opposition parties and other political and social actors, is a grave strategic mistake on the part of the Sudanese government and the SPLM. Sudanese political forces of all shapes and colors, despite their reservations about the agreement and its provisions, have strongly supported the principle of stopping the war and bloodshed, and their removal or exclusion constitutes a loophole through which many problems can escape in the future.
The absence of the northern opposition political parties as a major negotiating partner weakened the government’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the SPLM. The government could have used the northern opposition as a pressure card in the negotiations, especially since the SPLM was also using the American and African pressure card, represented by the IGAD countries. Despite these parties claiming complete neutrality, they exerted intense pressure on the Khartoum government, and in particular the American side, to accept the agreement.
This duality also had a negative impact within the southern bloc, which broke away from the SPLM or was fighting on its own, and had previously signed peace agreements with the Sudanese government in Khartoum. These groups did not participate directly in the negotiations that took place recently, and I believe that this was a tactical mistake on the part of the Khartoum government. Some of these groups have begun to feel fear and anxiety about losing their interests included in the agreements they previously signed with the government of Sudan. Some sources say that some of the leaders of these groups have moved outside Sudan and formed a movement opposed to the government and the concluded agreement.
Also, the absence of the Arab role in those negotiations, especially the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Libyan Jamahiriya, has increased the weakness of the government’s negotiating position, which could have used that card as well, especially since stopping the war, establishing security in Sudan, and stabilizing peace there is a matter that concerns both countries, and affects their strategic interests by virtue of the geographical location, and the religious, linguistic, and social overlap, in addition to the issue of the Nile waters, which for Egypt is an important strategic matter.
Self-determination and the outcome of national unity
In its terms, the agreement dealt with crucial issues related to the unity of the state that only two parties, namely the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Sudanese government, could decide on. Matters of self-determination, in accordance with globally applicable norms, are not negotiated by governments because they usually represent a narrow political scope for one party or group of parties. Rather, the matter is decided mostly by constitutional national gatherings, or round tables that represent all segments of political, civil, and religious society and other scholars, thinkers, and tribal and clan leaders.
In this regard, we have many experiences in the world, including, for example, the Round Table Conference in the Republic of Poland that took place in 1989 AD, which was able to resolve all the points of existing disagreement with the participation of all national forces and spare Poland the dangers of falling into an internal armed conflict, or resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland, etc.
The bilateral agreement may open the appetite of other fighting parties in the marginalized areas of Sudan to follow the example of the Popular Movement in order to achieve the goals they aspire to, which may make Sudan a rich spoil for the various parties to seize according to their interests, and thus increase the ambitions of foreign countries that are waiting for the prey to fall in order to devour what they want.
The agreement between the two parties was not concluded in a complete and complete democratic atmosphere, and this is considered a major and principled mistake committed by the SPLM, especially since it had, for many years, accused the Khartoum government of totalitarianism and straying from democratic foundations. On this basis, the movement entered into prior agreements with the opposition National Rally that would restore democracy to political life in Sudan. The lack of democracy in Sudan was one of the main justifications that the SPLM used to continue armed action for many years. However, the concluded agreement focuses mainly on sharing power and wealth between the SPLM and the Sudanese government, without taking into account other national forces, in particular the opposition northern movement, while the issue of democracy was included as one of the secondary items in the agreement, with the hope that it will be resolved in the transitional phase. Talk about democracy was present and intense from all negotiating parties, but it was general and was not the basis on which the negotiations or their provisions were based. Neither the Sudanese government nor the SPLM wanted democracy to be the basic basis of this agreement so that the private interests of both parties would not be harmed.
Reservations and opposition from the extremist Islamic movement
Reservations towards the agreement concluded between Khartoum and the SPLM did not come only from the northern opposition parties, but also began to appear clearly from some aspects of the extremist or conservative Islamic movement, which was originally loyal to the Khartoum government.
Despite the difference in type, form and content of the reservations, they fill the holes in this agreement and weaken its stability. The northern opposition parties fault him for his dualism and violation of democratic foundations, and doubt his ability to solve Sudan’s complex issues. As for the extremist Islamic movement, they see in the agreement a clear injustice to the northern parties, especially the marginalized ones. They also see in the power-sharing that allows John Garang, the leader of the SPLM, to assume the position of First Vice President of the Republic, and his right to criticize or disapprove of any decision issued by the president, a great influence that harms northern interests.
They also criticized the agreement for the unfair division of the country's national wealth and the South's access to 50% of oil revenues, as well as 50% of non-oil revenues from the South, such as taxes, customs, etc. The agreement also defined, in their opinion, and included southern interests in detail and precisely, while leaving northern interests in a floating form, especially since there are many marginalized northern regions. In addition, they expressed their deep fear that this agreement would ultimately lead to the separation of the South from the North of Sudan.
The future of the agreement and the prospects for resolving the Sudanese problem
Those familiar with Sudanese affairs believe that there may be difficulty on the part of the two parties in implementing the obligations they signed. This is due to the conflict of interests and the clear contradiction between the provisions included in the agreement and the interpretation of their essential meanings differently by each party.
The agreement also did not take into account other armed conflicts in Sudan, such as the Darfur problem, for example, as it is a serious problem that may make the government unable to adhere to the terms of the agreement due to internal and external pressures. Although the agreement referred to this issue in some of its texts, these references were general and incidental, and this dilemma was not dealt with with the required attention despite the severity of its aggravation at the moment of signing the agreement.
In my opinion, the most important feature of this agreement and what distinguishes it from other previous agreements is not only stopping the war, but rather the impossibility of returning to the option of war again because it is a non-strategic and useless option even for the Popular Movement itself. By returning to the war option, it will lose its credibility with all parties, especially since the opposition political parties strongly supported the principle of stopping the war, despite their reservations about the agreement, and the external parties (the American side and IGAD) also strongly supported the popular movement in the hope of stopping the war and bloodshed.
However, stopping the war alone will not solve Sudan’s intractable and multiple problems, not in the south alone but in many regions. However, it can form a basis and a solid basis for resolving these difficulties, not on a bilateral basis between two parties only, and not on the principle of sharing wealth and power, but on a free democratic basis that allows everyone to participate in power and wealth, regardless of their races, religions, or party affiliations, and for this democracy not to be merely elections. Only parliamentary, even if it is fair, but the rule of the state of law, citizenship, development of resources and the fair distribution of them.
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