Memorandum from Congress to President Bush regarding peace negotiations regarding peace in Sudan
On April 20, 2004
Quoted from the Emirati statement
Contents of the memo
How did we get to this situation?
Who made these agreements possible?
April 20, 2004
President George W. Bush
The White House
Mr. President
At a time when the negotiations in Naivasha, Kenya are entering a critical phase after two years of peace talks between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, and at a time when the report on the Sudan Peace Law is expected to be issued and passed, we address you with our views and concerns about the current status of the negotiations, and the behavior of each party during the past two years of negotiation.
We bring to your attention this lengthy letter for two main reasons. First, we would like to ensure that the administration’s report on the peace law in Sudan reflects the records and positions of the two parties during the negotiations. A general condemnation of the two parties or including both parties cannot be fair to both parties, nor can it be fair to the millions of Sudanese who are eager to know the facts in all their details. Second: We want to clearly document what we believe is a fair assessment of the records of the two parties and provide evidence that supports our position.
How did we get to this situation?
It has been a long and arduous journey for both parties. The current conflict in Sudan has developed since 1983, when the then ruling military junta imposed Islamic Sharia laws, which constituted a violation of the peace agreement signed by the southerners and the central government in Addis Ababa in 1972.
The current government continued the violence and repression and added more fuel to the war that broke out in 1983. In fact, the National Islamic Front government, in addition to its 1989 overthrow of an elected democratic government, accelerated the conflict in several ways and demonstrated its unilateral and intransigent positions in negotiations over the years.
Many efforts to find a negotiated settlement failed, due to violations of the ruling National Islamic Front throughout the previous decade. The current phase of the peace process began in 1994 under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the Government of Sudan has repeatedly worked to obstruct the peace process. Instead, it sided with the escalation of comprehensive destructive military actions against the South. The Sudanese government did not take the peace process seriously until the late 1990s, albeit reluctantly.
There were several factors behind this government shift. First: Years of international isolation and sanctions affected the regime. Second: The military successes achieved by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army refuted the Sudanese government's claim of achieving a military victory and winning the war with great ease. The continued intervention of the Bush administration at the highest levels was essential in ensuring that important agreements were reached in the current negotiations.
Since the signing of the Machakos Agreement in July 2002, the two parties have signed several important agreements, including self-determination for southerners, the role of religion in governance, an agreement on security arrangements during the transitional period, and a wealth-sharing agreement, and they have achieved important progress in the power-sharing agreement.
Two issues have not been decided, namely the status of the national capital and the disputed areas, namely the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile and Abyei.
Who made these agreements possible?
Both the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement have made important concessions since the start of the current talks in June 2002. In July 2002, the Machakos Protocol was signed, which includes a six-year transitional period, and a referendum on the political future of South Sudan at the end of the transitional period.
The protocol also stipulated that Islamic Sharia laws would not be applied in South Sudan. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement made important concessions in order to reach this agreement, although supporters of the Government of Sudan have indicated that it was Khartoum that made reaching this agreement possible. But a careful examination of the positions of both parties clearly reveals which party made the most important concessions in order to reach this agreement.
Regarding the issue of self-determination for the south, the government had previously approved the right to self-determination by accepting the Declaration of IGAD Principles (1994-1997) as a basis for negotiation. In fact, the government of Sudan signed a peace agreement with Riek Machar in 1997, and under that agreement accepted the right to self-determination for the south, setting a period of four years for this, and holding a referendum before the end of the transitional period.
It is important to note here that the Sudan People's Liberation Movement has long been insisting on a short transitional period of two or four years. In the Machakos Protocol signed in 2002, the SPLM accepted a longer transitional period (6 years) in order to allow for unity and make this agreement possible. The importance of this desire to extend the transitional period is something that cannot be overlooked, especially since it was met with widespread criticism from various southern entities.
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) also ceded its position opposing Islamic law by agreeing to the continued application of Islamic law in the north, even though both the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Government of Sudan had agreed under the IGAD Declaration of Principles to have a "secular and democratic" Sudan.
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement's concession was met with widespread criticism, even among some of its members. Members of the National Democratic Rally, an alliance that includes opposition groups including the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, expressed their dissatisfaction with the continued application of Islamic law in the north, and accused the movement of violating agreements reached by members of the Rally in 1995, and also of departing from the IGAD Declaration of Principles, all of which demand the separation of religion from politics and a democratic Sudan specifically.
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement has found itself in a very difficult position on the issue of legitimacy and its place in the final agreement. It is necessary to remember that the international community may face severe criticism for adopting an extremist Islamic approach, which this regime has adopted since 1989. This could be a bad sign for countries with multi-religious populations living within them.
In January 2004, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement signed a “framework agreement to share power during the transitional period.” After several weeks of continuous and intense negotiations, the two parties agreed on dividing the oil revenues extracted in South Sudan, granting the government of South Sudan 50% and the same to the central government. The two parties also agreed not to negotiate existing contracts, and to establish a dual banking system, as well as to share (5050) non-oil revenues in South Sudan.
Government supporters claim that sharing oil and non-oil revenues constitutes major concessions by Khartoum. But if we consider the revenues to be shared, it is easy to reach a different conclusion. The southern Sudanese, for example, will not benefit from any resources in the north under the agreement they signed. If we compare this case with other cases, we can conclude that these arrangements are in fact a concession by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. For example, during the transitional period between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1991-1993), Eritrea kept all its resources, and did not give Ethiopia anything.
Perhaps the agreement on security arrangements during the transitional period is one of the most important and difficult agreements that have been reached. In September 2003, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement signed a comprehensive and profound security agreement, and the two sides agreed to continue the separation between their forces, and to deal with them as Sudanese national armed forces.
They agreed on a proportional reduction of their forces and the withdrawal of the northern forces from South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement forces from the north, as well as the formation of joint units and a joint defense council. The government of Sudan made important concessions by agreeing to withdraw its forces from South Sudan and by granting the Sudan People's Liberation Movement forces control over security in the south.
The logic behind these concessions is unclear, although the government of Sudan had previously agreed to the same terms in the 1997 peace agreement with Riek Machar.
The two parties have not yet signed a power-sharing agreement, although agreements have been signed on most basic issues. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement made most of the important concessions during the third round of IGAD negotiations during January-February 2003, when the Sudan People's Liberation Movement decided not to proceed with its demand for a national presidency, which removed a fundamental obstacle to negotiating power-sharing.
In addition, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement's acceptance of the position of Vice President without the possibility of him becoming President met one of the main demands of the Government of Sudan and brought the two parties closer to signing an agreement. Moreover, the SPLM accepted - albeit reluctantly - the position of a second Vice President from the North. The SPLM also agreed to the National Congress Party's control of the legislative and judicial bodies, and the executive branches of the national government.
The peace process in Sudan has reached a decisive moment, and the issue of applying Sharia in the capital has been one of the most difficult topics in the current negotiations. The Sudanese government insists on applying Sharia to all of the capital, without exception for non-Muslims. Since the negotiations on the status of the national capital began, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement has continued to make major concessions.
From the beginning, the movement proposed not to apply Sharia laws in the capital, as long as the capital should be a reflection of the national character of all Sudanese residents. Then, at a later stage, I proposed allocating a part of the capital to be the headquarters of the national government, within which Sharia laws would not be applied, provided that Sharia would be applied to the remaining parts of the capital. In early April 2004, for the second time, the Popular Movement made additional concessions by accepting the application of Islamic law to the entire capital on the condition that non-Muslims are excluded.
In a memorandum sent to Secretary of State Colin Powell, the US Commission for International Religious Freedom appealed to exclude non-Muslims in all of Sudan from Sharia laws, saying: “Sudan is a multi-religious country, and most of the population are Sunni Muslims, but it also includes a large segment of Christians and those with African religions and beliefs.”
The National Islamic Front’s imposition of Islamic Sharia laws in Khartoum and throughout Sudan was one of the main reasons behind the longest, most deadly and destructive wars in Africa, and because religious freedom was one of the main issues in the civil war in Sudan, the Commission appeals to the United States of America to oppose the application of Islamic Sharia law to non-Muslims wherever they live in the country.
The Commission also calls for the capital of a unified Sudan in the north and south - usually Khartoum - to be a place where all people of all religions practice their religious rituals freely and where the laws reflect and respect all religions, customs and customs in Sudan. The capital of the state is for all its residents.
In May 2003, the leaders of the two largest political parties, the Democratic Union Party and the Umma Party, which represent the majority of Muslims in Sudan, signed an agreement with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement calling for an agreement on a “national capital that deals with all religions and beliefs equally.” Therefore, it is extremely necessary for the administration to support the exclusion of non-Muslims and demand, in the Naivasha negotiations, that all religions and beliefs be respected.
In addition to this historical sequence of concessions in the peace negotiations in Naivasha, we would also like to point out the violations of the Government of Sudan during the peace talks process. We must not lose sight of the fact that the progress that occurred in the negotiations does not exempt the Government of Sudan from the widespread violations of human rights in Darfur and other areas in Sudan, the refusal of access to humanitarian relief organizations, non-governmental bodies and the United Nations, and the faltering of the peace negotiations through the government’s withdrawal and ceasefire violations.
Since the signing of the Machakos Protocol, the Government of Sudan has withdrawn from the negotiations more than four times, while the leadership of the SPLM remained and did not leave the site of the talks. During the past few months alone, the government delegation withdrew from the negotiations, citing consultation or other reasons, three times.
Mr. President, we look forward to reviewing and approving the Sudan Peace Law, and we appeal to you to take into account everything we have documented in this memorandum. We hope that you will keep in mind the multiple violations of the Government of Sudan, and the important concessions previously made by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, when you submit your report on the position of the peace negotiations to Congress on April 21. It would be in the interest of the SPLM, which could be considered a lack of appreciation for what it has provided and support for the credibility of the Government of Sudan, and thus the possibility of the collapse of the peace negotiations if the report does not include the precise details of the progress of the negotiation process.
Congressman Tom Tancredo
Donald Payne Congressman
Congressman Chris Smith
joseph r. Congressman Bates
Tom Lantos, Congressman
Cc:
Colin Powell, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, National Security AdvisorNew Kush Back to Documentation Page Arkamani Comprehensive ContentsReturn to the documents page
Background painting: The ruins of the palace of the King of Sennar as painted by Caio in 1821