Almost any contemporary interpretation of cultural development owes a great deal of its elements to Marxist thought. It is noted that there are three main schools in contemporary anthropology, all of which claim to be drawn from the source of Marxist inspiration: cultural materialism, Marxist structuralism, and dialectical materialism. Together, the three schools constitute a large part of the theoretical structure of the contemporary analysis of cultural development, which requires us to address them with explanation, clarification, and analysis. We believe that we begin our presentation by addressing the materialistic cultural treatment because it constitutes a simplification of the other two treatments. Despite the many differences in the field of terminology, hypotheses, and method, the cultural-materialist trend is characterized by a logical structure that reflects many similarities to the logical structure of the cultural-ecological trend. The latter trend explains the variation between different cultures of peoples within the framework of environmental diversity. It is also concerned with revealing how culture affects individuals’ adaptation to the radical changes that may occur in the environment. The environment, according to advocates of the ecological cultural trend, is not limited to the physical environment only, but also includes all the living organisms that surround man, whether of his own kind or different from him, and they are all interconnected in an integrated system, which they called the term “ecological system,” which has become an area of their focused studies. Cultural ecologists give special importance to research design methods and means of collecting material, and to using linguistic science concepts and methods (such as biology, nutrition, medicine, population, and agricultural sciences), with the aim of forming a perception of the patterns of interaction between the environment and living organisms. As a result, this trend has become similar to the theory of biological evolution, which may explain the process of adaptation, but is unable to predict or determine the origin or causes of change. Since our treatment of the materialistic-cultural trend applies its basics to the ecological-cultural trend, we will limit ourselves to analyzing the first only.
The cultural materialist trend, as explained by one of its most enthusiastic advocates, Marvin Harris, “assumes that the methodological precedence is directed to the search for laws of history in anthropology,” on the basis of a logical, positivist, epistemological methodological approach, with Harris being aware of the criticism directed at some aspects of logical positivism. Harris's debt to this complex epistemology is limited to focusing on "events, units, and relationships that can be perceived through logical, inductive, deductive, empirical processes that are measurable and subject to experience by independent observers."
In his interpretation of cultural evolution, Harris impersonates Karl Marx's tripartite division of human society: base, structure, and superstructure. Harris believes that all cultural change and all societies can be analyzed through modes of production (i.e. economic systems and subsistence techniques), modes of reproduction (i.e. mating patterns and methods of population control), political economy (i.e. class, caste, and war), and superstructure (i.e. art and religion). These units are articulated in infrastructure to form patterns of production and reproduction, a structure that includes the domestic and political economy, and the superstructure. Harris believes that the basis that links these units is that the patterns of production and reproduction act as a “probabilistic determinant” for the domestic economy and the political economy, which in turn act as a “probabilistic determinism” for the superstructure.
For Harris and the cultural materialists, this principle does not constitute a law according to the concept of Newton's law, but it often constitutes a research strategy that can provide the possibility of arriving at an understanding based on the laws of nature and logic, such as the principle of natural selection in Darwin's theory. Harris says that by translating this principle as a research strategy, “this principle of techno-environmental determinism assumes that the priority should be given to the study of the material conditions of life to the same extent that the principle of natural selection assumes the priority to be the study of the ultimate differential success in reproduction.”
Hence, Harris's interest in his interpretation of cultural evolution focuses on monitoring and interpreting changes, that is, changes in patterns of production and patterns of reproduction that can, under certain conditions, produce transformations in structure and infrastructure. These transformations are expressed, in Harris' view, through the emergence of societies based on class hierarchy in which unequal acquisition of wealth and power is the distinguishing feature, and through the emergence of official religions, economies of international dependence, and recurring wars. Harris insists on emphasizing that he does not call for the establishment of a mechanical or fixed and unchanging connection between both infrastructure and superstructure through which cultural phenomena can be speculated on, as is the case in thermomechanics. Harris maintains that the elements of structure and infrastructure can and do achieve some measures of independent causality, so that the relationship between infrastructure and superstructure in any society appears - for the purposes of analysis - to be a mutual (feedback) relationship that can be translated according to systems theory.
When explaining the emergence of the first forms of tribal leadership formations (chiefdoms) and states, Harris emphasizes the interplay between natural environments and the reproductive capabilities of human structures. It is noted that Harris defines social forms according to cultural evolutionary normative structures. Harris believes that the frequency of events and relationships that lead to the production of all early complex societies looks like this:
The climatic changes that occurred in the late Pleistocene era, with the increasing population density among human beings, led to the depletion of plant and animal resources, so that the cost/benefit ratio associated with the activity of hunting and gathering food showed a shift in favor of the activity related to agriculture and animal husbandry. These emerging conditions led to the “selection” of agricultural economies and sedentary communities, enabling the groups that experimented with adopting agricultural and pastoral economies to adapt and complete the process of reproducing themselves at the expense of mobile and unstable hunting and food-gathering groups.
Harris excludes Peru and some other regions that witnessed the emergence of stable lifestyles with an increase in population density despite the lack of agricultural economies. Harris believes that the subsequent emergence of complex cultures came as a result of those early agricultural societies that arose in ecological and social environments that allowed for natural growth through which a single individual became a leader responsible for making vital decisions related to the intensification of production, the redistribution of resources, and the management of war and trade. Once this type of “administrative” individual appears, the society, under the pressures of competition with neighboring societies, and under the pressure of population growth, rushes to higher and higher levels of intensive production and social hierarchy. Harris writes, “Such systems show a tendency to move from consistent forms of reproduction to asymmetric forms in which distributors hold on to more of the product for longer and longer periods... Contributions to the rates of economic redistribution gradually cease to be natural... They quickly become taxes and at that moment sheikhdoms are on the threshold of becoming states.”
Harris proposes a hypothesis that says that many early states used war and military expansion as main tools to control population growth. Once states were formed, they continued to grow rapidly as long as neighboring, less complex societies had only one of two options: either to surrender or to develop in the same direction.
Harris explains the different evolutionary paths of the early countries, to a large extent, by resorting to the use of elements of agro-ecological growth, such as the higher capabilities to intensify grain production and the development of grazing strategies in the southern Arabian Peninsula compared to root crops and wild pigs, in the sense of clarifying the ecological limits to the emergence of early agricultural societies precisely, since once a certain population density was reached, people had a strong incentive either to intensify the product to avoid famine, or to migrate to areas with a lower population density due to their limited capabilities. agriculture, leading to a lower standard of living.
If we extract some of the Marxist terminology inherent in Harris's interpretation of cultural evolution, his interpretation would seem similar to the analyzes expressed in cultural ecological treatments in terms of the focus on the environmental technical imperative, the importance of population pressures, and in general a view of cultural evolution as reflected in many successive solutions to the problems of diminishing resources, increasing population density, and competition. Hence, we see that the widespread spread of such ideas forces us to conduct a careful critical review of the logic of cultural materialism and other relevant treatments.
For example, the currently available archaeological evidence contradicts some of Harris's conclusions regarding the extinction of hunting (megafauna) in the Pleistocene era. Some researchers also doubt the importance of population pressures for the emergence of early cultures. Functional explanations are arguments that indicate the presence of some elements/or a combination of elements in a particular system that contribute to the adaptive competition of that system. From this standpoint, Harris explains the emergence of leaders in early complex societies in light of the administrative tasks that are accomplished through this “leadership.” This type of interpretation faces some limitation, which is represented by the problem of equal teleology, since for every adaptive problem posed by a cultural environment or any other environment, it is possible to imagine possible functional alternatives as a solution to that problem. Why, for example, did early agricultural societies not implement stricter population control, or create cooperative, democratic, or egalitarian institutions to deal with their problems rather than produce a “solution” represented by chiefs? Cultural materialists usually provide an answer in which they rely on an analysis of psychological tendencies, or on a cost/benefit analysis of different possible possibilities, to prove that leaders (or any other elements) are the most efficient. This argument contains, in our opinion, what Lewontin, in his criticism of social biology, called the false idea that “what is advanced for this very purpose is perfected agency.”
This “logical error” is usually most evident in the biological sciences in the case of many experiments in which an aspect of an organism’s life history is isolated on the basis that this aspect constitutes a problem that requires a solution. Then, in a typical way, what might be an optimal solution to the problem is determined through engineering analysis in the case of certain environmental constraints. The organism is measured to determine the extent to which a particular trait matches the optimal solution. If the result is positive, an acceptable argument is formulated to explain that the appearance of the trait is a response to the problem. However, in the case of a negative result, meaning that there is a discrepancy between the feature on the one hand and the optimal solution on the other side, a second problem is usually searched...and a third in an effort to find out whether part of the feature shows compatibility with several problems, or is, potentially, a response to a very different energy component. Lewontin believes that, given sufficient ingenuity and effort, it will be possible in this way to match any trait to an adaptive problem so that the true result in the end is that nothing is tested.
This “logical error” constitutes a complex element in many cultural materialist and cultural ecological analyses. Cultural ecologists usually resort to describing ancient natural and cultural environments to extrapolate adaptive problems for which they assume a solution in leaders, wars, and so on.
Marxist structuralists stand at the forefront of critics of the cultural materialist and ecological and cultural trends. Marxist structural interpretations of cultural development resort to borrowing many concepts founded by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, such as the concepts of the mode of production and the dialectical nature of history. For Marx, the concept of the mode of production includes both the forces of production and the relations of production. Marx believes that on the basis of productive forces and production relations, elements of structure and elements of superstructure arise, so that it becomes possible to interpret history and cultural development through analysis of changing modes of production. Although many supporters of the materialist and cultural-structuralist Marxist tendencies show some degree of agreement regarding a definition of the forces of production based on basic technical-environmental terms (for example, climate, agricultural systems, mechanisms, etc.).
However, the claim that the relations of social production and their strength are what determine and determine other aspects of society has remained a controversial issue since the dawn of the Marxist synthesis. Without going into the midst of the details related to this complex and thorny topic, we say that most Marxist structuralists emphasize the statement that the relations of social production are what determine the form, content, and history of society. For example, Friedman explains production relations as “those relations that necessitate the economic cycle of the material production process under certain technical and ecological conditions at a certain stage in the development of the productive forces.” Friedman enumerates models of things that are necessitated by social production relations:
1- Benefiting from the environment within the limits presented by technical capabilities.
2- Division of roles in the production process, meaning who does/who does not do the physical work.
3- Forms of appropriation of social surplus, forms of its distribution, and how to use economic surplus.
4- A socially calculated value for the percentage of surplus and profit?
Thus, Friedman argues that patterns of social change cannot be understood by attributing the main causal roles to population growth, the ecology of agricultural production, and other elements of environmental technology. It is precisely at this point that Friedman’s objection and criticism directed at cultural materialist treatments and cultural ecological analyzes are concentrated.
Sallins expresses the same idea through his attempts to emphasize the power of the elements of structure and superstructure to determine infrastructural phenomena by examining the “completely illogical” compounds in contemporary societies, and he asks about the reasons behind the emotional theory of Americans’ relationship with dogs and horses and their avoidance of eating their meat at a time when they have no reservations about eating millions of cows. Sallins says that this fact may prove the futility of attempts aimed at analyzing cultural phenomena according to a perspective that attributes the utmost importance to the economy, as observed in cultural materialist and cultural ecological treatments. For Sallins, “material conditions and feasibility exist for people not as a natural fact but as a cultural construct...the natural conditions of applicability (selective forces) constitute merely negative obstacles...limits to functional possibilities that remain unrenewed for the generation of cultural forms involved.” For this reason, Salins assumes that the use of pork in Malinbezia, or cannibalism among the Aztecs, or the emergence of the first chiefdoms in Mesopotamia cannot be explained on the basis of demographic, ecological, or economic variables. "Cultural." Each culture differentially determines such things as “the close connection between all possible resources” that determine the way a resource is used and the intensity of its exploitation according to its own cultural logic.
Such a position, that the patterns of production in any specific society are uniquely composed according to the cultural logic of the societies in which those patterns exist, has been expressed in most Marxist structural analyses. Thus, we find that Friedman assumes that the same mode of production in different societies must adapt to its specific social environment in which it performs its function. Since every society can form a mixture of different modes of production that establish various relationships within society, a specific mode of production cannot appear in a “pure form.” A capitalist mode of production prevails in France, England, Germany, and the United States of America, but it is noted that the social structures in those countries are based on conflicting modes of production in their relations with each other.
Marx's analysis of history is based on the assumption that history is a dialectical process that includes successive tensions of the hypothesis, the negation of the hypothesis (the counter-hypothesis), and the synthesis that denies the counter-hypothesis but carries the features of the hypothesis and the counter-hypothesis and maintains them but at a higher level. The example that has become worn out due to its frequent use is that of the seed (the hypothesis) from which the Napata arises (the counter-hypothesis) and the return of the Napata to a seed, but this time with many seeds (the synthesis). In all concrete historical materials - that is, in actual reality - this dialectical process can be observed, the result of which is the upward path of history. The evolutionary aspect was made clear in the works of Engels, but it was more evident in the writings of Marx: “At a certain stage in its development, the material productive forces of society enter into conflict with the property relations within which they were active. From the forms of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into chains that bind them. Then the era of social revolution begins.” For Marx, cultural development occurs not through the succession of pre-arranged stages, but through the dissolution of societies through the dialectical process. A particular mode of production cannot change itself into another mode as long as it contains contradictions that will lead to its annihilation.
What, then, is the role of historical analysis? One of the advocates of Marxist structuralism, the anthropologist Legros, sees that the role revolves around creating a theory for a specific mode of production and then using it to analyze the similarities and differences in contemporary and extinct societies... “General development can only be explained if the basic requirements of each mode of production are emphasized, since in order to uncover the roots of the mode of production Legros believes that the concept of the mode of production according to the content that Marx uses in it is related to the dialectical nature of history. In Legros' opinion, the mode of production represents "a distinct criterion for the science of history, and allows us to establish an evolutionary sequence, that is, a succession of modes of production."
Dialectical materialist trend
The third model of Marxist treatments of the problem of cultural development is represented by the dialectical materialist trend. Most of the specialized writings based in their analyzes on the logic of dialectical materialism have been imbued with the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism as presented by Joseph Stalin. This interpretation is based on the concept of socio-economic formation as an objective standard for comparing cultural systems and diagnosing the stage of historical development that they pass through. This makes it possible to reveal the general phenomena of the cultural systems in these countries, and at the same time makes it possible to distinguish the prevailing differences between them within the scope of the formation itself, as each socio-economic formation is a special cultural entity with its own laws for its emergence, development, and transformation into another formation. One of the issues that relates to the structure of the formation is the issue of the interconnection between the base and the superstructure, between the economy and politics. The specific mode of production is the basis of every variety of formations. If this mode is replaced by another mode of production, this leads to the replacement of one variety by another variety. When the level of the mode of production and the degree of its development changes, the stages of development of the variety itself change accordingly. But in addition to the prevailing mode of production that defines the face of the particular variety and shows it, it is possible that there exist within the variety, and it actually exists, special patterns of the economy of the remnants of the old mode of production, or features that indicate the signs of the new mode of production.
Then comes the reading presented by Stalin in his book “Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism” to say that there are five basic social and economic formations in succession: the primitive communal system, the slavery system, the feudal system, the capitalist system, and finally the communist system, the first stage of which is socialism. This succession of socio-economic formations is the process of historical development and the basic stages of the progress of culture.
Hence, the writings of advocates of the dialectical materialist trend appear to be mostly typological (typological) exercises in which the affiliation of this or that currently known society or from the reality of the archaeological record to any of the aforementioned socio-economic formations is demonstrated. People of the dialectical materialist trend often point out the error of their non-Marxist colleagues, or Marxists who are not committed to the logic of the dialectical materialist trend, for using social models (typologies) that divide societies according to what dialectical materialists see as secondary and trivial characteristics. This is at a time when dialectical materialists adopt an interpretation of their own models (their own typologies) according to the terms of historical debate. For example, we note that dialectical materialist archaeologists, when dealing with ancient Mesopotamian societies, examine data in search of evidence indicating patterns of production, the distribution of economic surplus, the degree of economic exploitation, etc. If we exclude these concepts, we will notice that many of these dialectical materialist analyzes do not appear to be very different from cultural ecological studies of matter itself.
Dialectical materialist archaeologists have undoubtedly contributed to enriching the modern analysis of cultural development. However, the general theoretical position of most of their works is limited to their conviction that the answer to the important questions related to the problem of the development of culture has been presented, and all that remains for scientific research is to identify the evidence that proves the validity of the Marxist-Leninist political theory from the reality of ethnographic and archaeological data.
Finally, it can be said briefly that the functional analyzes and explanations offered by cultural materialism and cultural ecology mostly resort to an unproven description of how ancient societies performed their functions.
Most of the analyzes presented for the logic of functional analysis emphasize the fact that it can play a useful role in describing data, in generating further useful research, and in directing attention to an important form of data (paleontology). But on the other hand, this analysis cannot provide comprehensive explanations of the cultural origins or laws that many believe constitute the goal of modern anthropology. It seems that Marxist structuralists and dialectical materialists share this failure with their cultural materialist and cultural ecologist colleagues.
About the roots of northern civilization