In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

National Democratic Rally

Leadership body meeting

Asmara 14 - 22 July 2004 AD

Notes by the National Democratic Rally on the protocols of the peace agreement signed between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Salvation Government

Introduction:

The signing of the six protocols on May 26, 2004 between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Salvation Government represents an important step towards ending the civil war, achieving peace, and placing our country on a new path of development. Hence, the National Democratic Rally welcomes this step based on several basic facts, the most important of which are:

1- Ending the civil war in the south of the country and opening the way to achieving peace is considered a fundamental national issue according to which killing and destruction can be stopped. It also constitutes a major gateway to confronting the chronic Sudanese crisis, which has become more exacerbated under the current rescue regime.

2- The agreement creates a disruption in the structure of the totalitarian salvation system in favor of a pluralistic democratic system. It also creates a new reality that provides a suitable climate for peaceful political conflict in the country for the benefit of investment from various political and social forces struggling to achieve democratic transformation and to achieve the goals and aspirations of the Sudanese people.

3- The protocols contain many aspects that meet the aspirations of our people for broad decentralization, especially in the south of the country, in South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile, and Abyei. They also contain many other general positive points that concern our people throughout the country, such as what was stated in the protocol on the division of power regarding:

A -     What was stated in the preamble to the agreement about the aspiration for the agreement to become comprehensive and unanimously agreed upon by all the people of Sudan.

B -     Commitment to the democratic transformation through commitment to human rights as stipulated in international conventions, and by codifying this in a transitional democratic constitution, and by holding general elections at all levels to be completed by the end of the first half of the transitional period, and by forming an independent commission to monitor human rights in the country, in addition to forming a number of independent commissions to review the conditions of the judiciary, the civil service, elections, etc.

T-    Agreeing on the priority of unity and working to make it an attractive option.

D-    Providing guarantees for the implementation of the agreement through regional and international participation.

But the protocols go beyond the issue of war and peace to address all aspects of the Sudanese crisis, including issues: peace, identity, unity, democracy, the system of government, development and division of wealth, the army and security, foreign relations...etc. It also seeks to bring about fundamental changes in the structure of the existing political system, including self-determination of the country (one state or two states) during the transitional period. It is clear that these issues cannot be decided by only two parties (the government and the movement) apart from the other northern and southern political and social forces, knowing that the national consensus on these crucial issues is the only guarantee for the continuation of peace in the south and its spread to extinguish the flames of war raging in Darfur, and its potential outbreak in other hotspots of tension in the country. This national consensus can only be achieved by transforming the agreement signed between the Popular Movement and the Salvation Government from a bilateral agreement to a comprehensive national agreement that addresses all aspects of the national crisis and with all active forces participating in its discussion, approval and implementation.

Shortcomings and negatives:

Our warm welcome to the step of signing the six protocols, and our sincere call to endorse and support everything that is positive in them, does not mean that we overlook what we see as the negatives, shortcomings, and contradictions in these protocols. We believe that the basis of these shortcomings, negatives and contradictions is due to the main flaw inherent in the Machakos Framework Protocol, which the assembly had previously addressed with criticism and evaluation, and we had warned at the time that this flaw would cast a shadow over all subsequent detailed protocols and agreements. Among the negatives, shortcomings and contradictions that we see in the signed protocols are:

1- The system of government agreed upon in the transitional period is based on complex foundations and structures varying in their powers and levels. The constitutional structure is based on a presidential system and a national constitution at the center, a secular constitution for the southern region and similar constitutions for the southern states, constitutions (Islamic according to the point of view of salvation) for the northern states, a special status for the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan and the Abyei region (subject to the presidency), as well as a special status for the national capital... This situation reflects contradictions. There are clear imbalances and inequality in the powers of the different regions, and this is clearly evident in the southern region enjoying the status of a unified region, full confederation powers, and effective participation in the management of the center, and depriving the northern regions of this without a specific reason. At the same time, the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan enjoy broad powers, while the other northern states are granted less powers, which weakens the spirit of national cohesion and sets a dangerous precedent in a country where tribal and regional interests are in conflict. These imbalances and contradictions need to be addressed quickly, taking into account inclusiveness, justice, equality, and strengthening the center, by establishing a balanced decentralized system with equal powers at all levels and between all regions, without prejudice to what was stated in the protocols regarding the southern region.

2- One of the strongest parts of the agreement on the division of power is the part related to human rights and their universal declarations and covenants, and the stipulation of including them in the transitional national constitution. But the agreement included weak expressions about the binding of international human rights conventions, making them appear as good intentions rather than a constitutional obligation. The agreement also adopted a number of these rights while dropping a number of other rights contained in the conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in addition to the phrase “in accordance with the law” that restricts the exercise of these rights.

3- There is also a clear imbalance in the composition of the transitional legislative and executive institutions, as the National Congress Party controls the northern states, and the Popular Movement controls the south (70%), and both parties control the presidency of the republic and the central government (52% for the Congress, 28% for the movement), while granting other political forces simple nominal participation (20%). The same applies to the technical committees, the civil service, the security and military services, and others, through the texts of the agreement itself. This situation reflects a partnership that has absolute control over the institutions of the transitional period, which means that it is impossible to change this situation until the elections and perhaps after that. Even if the opposition forces win the next elections, they are obligated to implement this agreement as it is (paragraphs 1-8-6 of the power-sharing agreement). Of course, the continuation of this situation does not serve the cause of peace and stability, nor does it serve the cause of unity.

4- The agreement places itself above the transitional national constitution, as it stipulates that any conflict mentioned in the transitional constitution shall be the reference for the agreement. It also links the transitional constitution to the orientations of the two negotiating parties, as the committee proposed for this (the Constitution Review Committee) is primarily composed of the two parties, and is based on two references, which are the agreement and the 1998 Constitution. Therefore, the review and drafting of the transitional constitution takes place under their control, and its approval and amendment are linked to the approval of their now existing legislative institutions, with the symbolic participation of other political and social forces (paragraph 2-12 division of power).

5- With regard to the general elections, the agreement did not stipulate a specific date for the start of the elections, but rather specified the date for their end (Clause 1-8-3), and linked the setting of the date for the legislative and presidential elections to the agreement of the two parties (Clause 2-2-3-3) and (2-3-7). It also made the two parties the ones to decide the possibility of holding the elections within the period specified for their end from impossibility (Clause 1-8-4). As for the presidential elections, they were also subject to the agreement of the two parties only (Clause 2-3-7)

6- In its talk about national reconciliation, the agreement does not link it to the necessity of revealing facts related to human rights violations and administrative and financial corruption during the years of the rescue regime, restoring stolen rights and resolving injustices that affected the entire country, as a minimum of the necessary conditions for any reconciliation. It was necessary to propose a mechanism to achieve this purpose, such as the truth and reconciliation mechanism in South Africa or any other appropriate mechanism, instead of storing bitterness that will inevitably explode sooner or later.

7- No matter how good the intentions are, and no matter how many assurances are made about how the two parties will commit to forming the Sudanese National Army, common sense will not accept the idea that only two parties (the National Congress and the Popular Movement) will supervise the restructuring and restructuring of the Sudanese National Army, as stipulated in the protocols. On the other hand, the agreement did not address the Popular Defense Forces, which is a ideological militia affiliated with the Salvation regime, and constitutes a dangerous reserve that defends the interests of the Salvation Army.

8- The protocols did not address the issue of the political liquidation of civil and military service cadres, which was implemented by the rescue regime under the clause of dismissal from service for the public interest.

9- While welcoming what was stated in the protocols about stipulating limiting the powers of the security services to collect and analyze information, the agreement defeats the idea of the nationalism of these agencies when it follows the same path as the two parties sharing these agencies, which are supposed to be re-established and restructured on the basis of a new national security law, so that they become national agencies that can be trusted.

10-    With regard to the Protocol to Resolve the Conflict over Abyei, it adopts the ethnic definition of the region and not the administrative or geographical definition. It also does not address the borders of the region, determine its population, and the laws that govern it. In addition, the division of wealth in the region is based on tribal principles, which negatively affects national unity and the social fabric, and opens the door to practical questions about how to implement it. As for the conflict over South Kordofan and South Blue Nile, the legislative and executive powers in the two states were shared between the two parties to the agreement, with the complete exclusion of other political forces, even though they constitute a majority in the two regions (Article 11-1-1-). The state of West Kordofan was also canceled without any preparation or consultation and without even consistency with the Abyei Conflict Resolution Protocol.

11-   The clauses regarding the status of the national capital are somewhat ambiguous and may accept more than one interpretation, for example Clause 2-4-5-2 which stipulates: “Behavior consistent with culture and customs, which does not disturb public order, is not approved by other customs, or does not constitute a serious violation of the law or public order, is considered in the eyes of the law to be an exercise of a human right.” On the other hand, while the agreement excluded non-Muslims in the capital from the application of the so-called Islamic rescue laws, it did not disclose the status of non-Muslims in other regions in northern Sudan. The majority of Islamic forces in the country also reject the rescue proposals regarding Islamic legislation, considering them to express a narrow partisan vision.

12-    The wealth division agreement adheres to geographical and regional criteria in redividing wealth (especially oil revenues) between the North and the South, but it came in the form of a commercial and interest-based calculation, and at the same time it ignores the necessity of economic and social planning and the role of the state and the public sector in creating comprehensive and balanced development in all regions of the country. The agreement stems from the government economic program currently being implemented and implicitly focuses on the market economy, the role of the private sector, and the relationship with international financial institutions. Such an approach will not help in the development of the South and other marginalized regions, but rather will expand and deepen the conditions of marginalization in all regions for the benefit of their urban centers and their parasitic and bureaucratic groups. It is important here to work on linking the reconstruction and construction processes to a general economic and social plan drawn up by a national economic conference. A plan that takes into account developing the capabilities of the national economy in general and responding to the requirements of the war-affected and less developed regions in particular, by benefiting from all national experiences in this field and from the lessons of our experiences in previous stages, instead of leaving these tasks to foreign expertise and international financing institutions.

13-    The protocols stipulate that the peace agreement in its final form will be ratified by the current National Council and the National Liberation Council of the People’s Movement, which are two partisan institutions for the two negotiating parties, regardless of the participation of the successive parties in the National Salvation Council. But if the agreement is truly to address general national issues, it is necessary and obligatory for it to be ratified in an inclusive national conference in which all Sudanese political forces participate.

14-    Finally, the agreement talks about the priority of the unity option, but in practice it plants the seed of separation between the South and the North. From the beginning, the Machakos Protocol avoided the option of a unified civil, democratic state and decided to divide the country on a religious basis, including legislation, the banking system, etc. The protocols also stipulate the presence of two armies, one in the north and the other in the south. In addition, Clause 3-D of the Security Arrangements Agreement stipulates the absorption of southerners who are reduced from the armed forces into the institutions of the government of the south, which means sending harmful signals to the issue of unity, as well as the idea of ​​distributing wealth on the basis of lineage between the north and the south (providing for the division of oil), which encourages the separatist trend...etc.

The group’s position on the peace protocols

The National Democratic Rally welcomes the peace protocols signed between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Sudanese government, and believes that they represent an important step towards ending the civil war and addressing the roots of the chronic Sudanese crisis, and thus they constitute the end of a phase and the beginning of a new phase to achieve democratic transformation and consolidate peace. The agreement provides a basis for restructuring the unified national structure on new foundations that differ from the foundations that have existed since the dawn of independence, foundations that take into account the broad response to the regions’ requirements for decentralized governance and participation in power and development, and at the same time take into account the necessity of balance between the center and these regions, and affirm the country’s unity within the framework of its diversity and ethnic, religious and cultural pluralism. Therefore, the National Democratic Rally will work to exploit this rare opportunity provided by the agreement to address the aspects of the Sudanese crisis, by focusing and developing its positive aspects, and at the same time making the effort required to remedy its imbalances, starting with the fact that it was concluded between only two parties to the political equation in Sudan, in addition to a number of observations approved by the Rally in its evaluation of the protocols. In this regard, the Assembly considers the following measures a basic condition without which the agreement cannot achieve its desired goals:

First: The Sudanese crisis, with its depth and the intertwining and overlapping of its episodes (peace, unity, democracy and balanced development), cannot be resolved through an alliance or partnership between two parties alone, nor can it be treated as a by-product of resolving the issue of civil war in the south of the country. It is the task of all Sudanese political and social forces represented in the various parties and organizations. The agreement also did not end the factors of separation and threats to unity, and this is the responsibility of everyone in the North and South. Therefore, the National Democratic Rally requires that the final agreement reached by the two parties be presented to a broad conference that includes all representatives of the Sudanese political forces.

Second: The Sudanese political forces agree on a national consensus program that governs the transitional period, and all transitional bodies are committed to implementing it, and the various parties are also guided by it in their political practice. This program is built on the basis of its commitment to the peace agreement signed between the SPLM and the Sudanese government, and at the same time addresses the shortcomings and negatives found in this agreement, including the issue of balanced political participation in the institutions of the legislative and executive transitional period and the proposed commissions. In light of this program, the National Democratic Rally determines the form of its participation in the transitional government bodies.

Third: The National Democratic Rally sees the necessity of linking the peace agreement to immediately addressing the unfolding crisis in Darfur in its humanitarian and political dimensions. The correct approach to this response is to recognize that what is happening in Darfur is a true manifestation of the general crisis that Sudan is experiencing, the most prominent manifestations of which are the continuing marginalization of the country’s parties, including Darfur, and that the problem is political and requires a national political solution.

Fourth: The government is committed to immediately begin implementing all the requirements for democratic transformation: spreading public freedoms, abolishing exceptional laws restricting freedoms, lifting the state of emergency, lifting censorship of newspapers, freedom of political and union work...etc.

Fifth: Within the framework of the national consensus program called for by the assembly, and based on the wealth distribution protocol signed between the two parties, the assembly sees the necessity of agreeing on an appropriate and effective mechanism to rehabilitate the Sudanese economy and address the issues of unbalanced development in the country, with the priority being to address the issues of livelihood and the suffering of the daily life of the Sudanese citizen. In this regard, the group proposes a commitment to holding a national economic conference during the period before the transitional period, the results of whose work will be part of the program for the transitional period.

Sixth: Addressing the issue of displaced persons, displaced persons, and forcibly displaced people, and working on their return to their original villages and cities.

Seventh: Addressing the issue of those arbitrarily dismissed (for the public interest) from the civil and military service.

Eighth: Accountability and accountability for human rights violations and financial and administrative corruption during previous years.

Ninth: Conducting national reconciliation based on revealing the facts.

National Democratic Rally options:

There are several basic and pivotal factors that govern the determination of the group’s options in dealing with the new reality created by the agreement:

First: Although the Sudan People's Liberation Movement has signed peace protocols with the Sudanese government, it is an integral part of the National Democratic Rally in the struggle for decisive and effective solutions to the Sudanese crisis. In this context, it adheres to the decisions of the National Democratic Rally, most notably the 1995 Asmara Charters regarding crucial issues.

Second: The basic and necessary condition for achieving democratic transformation and consolidating peace remains the continuation of the National Democratic Rally, cohesive and unified, and developing its visions, programs and work mechanisms in line with the developments of the stage imposed by the agreement, and in response to the requirements of the new political reality. In this regard, the group develops a specific work program that is implemented at two levels:

Internal level: It is based on mobilizing and mobilizing the mass movement in order to achieve democratic transformation, in order to support the peace process and in order to transform the agreement into a comprehensive and comprehensive agreement, including bringing Darfur and the East into the equation.

External level: It is based on providing all possible support for the group’s activity at home and managing the expected negotiation with the government.

Therefore, holding the third conference of the group as soon as possible constitutes an important priority with the aim of confirming the unity of the group, and the necessity of absorbing the political developments after the signing of the peace agreement, and the development and modification that this requires in its structures and work mechanisms.

Third: The National Democratic Rally will throw all its weight into participating in the mechanisms for achieving democratic transformation in the country. But the group's other options, including participation in the transitional government, will be determined in light of two specific possibilities:

The first possibility: adherence to the signed protocols as they are without involving other political forces in discussing and approving them, and without providing appropriate mechanisms that meet the issue of inclusion and broad participation.

The second possibility: Implementing the requirements of democratic transformation and agreeing on a program to govern the transitional period upon which all political forces agree. Achieving this possibility depends on two outcomes:

1-              The outcome of the next round of negotiations between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the Sudanese government on the mechanisms for implementing the agreement.

2-              The outcome of the expected negotiations between the assembly and the government on the basis of the framework agreement to find a comprehensive political solution to the Sudanese problem, which occurred between the assembly and the government in the city of Jeddah on 12/4/2003, as well as the outcome of the negotiations on the explosive situation in Darfur.

National Democratic Rally leadership body

Asmara on July 20, 2004

Follow the decisions and recommendations of Asmara, July 2004