An interview with Mr. Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi
Tripoli - The Grand Hotel, Wednesday 9/5/2001
At the time when the first issue of Arkamani (issue 003 of the new Kosh) was published, Mr. Sadiq al-Mahdi, head of the Umma Party and the former legitimately elected prime minister, happened to be in Tripoli, so we saw it as a good opportunity to conduct a dialogue with His Excellency in accordance with the approach that Arkamani had planned in opening a calm dialogue with the Sudanese movements of their various stripes, aiming behind this to create qualitative interaction between them in order to form a vision that represents the minimum for a solution in Sudan. From his current crisis.
We took care at the moment of conducting the dialogue to delve into the intellectual foundations on which the man relied, leaving the task of tracking down the breathless daily events to our fellow professional journalists. Arkamani’s goal is to delve into the depths of Mr. Al-Sadiq’s mind, excavate and uncover what is hidden in Sudanese political and cultural thought, and prepare everyone to accept realistic assumptions and constants. The result was the totality of the questions posed by Dr. Osama Abdel-Rahman Elnur and Dr. Muhammad Hassan Pasha, over a period of two hours and more, to Mr. Al-Sadiq, who was kind enough to answer them in a calm dialogue. We hope that this dialogue will be useful when reading the political and intellectual scene in Sudan. Here is the dialogue:
Arkamani: Mr. Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, as one of the makers of political events in Sudan since the end of the sixties of the last century, and as Prime Minister there more than once, and as head of one of Sudan’s main parties (the Umma Party), this dialogue with you has its justifications. Therefore, Arkamani took the initiative to conduct this dialogue with the aim of clarifying your vision, as we feel that many educated people have begun to interpret and interpret your positions, especially since your recent return to Sudan, in what we saw as some of it being unfair to you or an invocation of the old saying, “Juhaina interrupted the speech of every preacher.” Therefore, we intended this dialogue to clarify, not justify... Sudan has, in fact, been experiencing changes and alignments since June 1989, such that no one has an argument to justify his standing on one side over the other. Rather, it needs to root its position.
Arkamani, in its name, is based on a clear position on the intellectual issues raised on the scene. It takes its name, a journal of Sudanese archeology and anthropology, from the king of ancient Kush - Arkamani - who, in the late third century BC, carried out the first radical change in the political concepts of his time, not only in his kingdom, but compared to what was the reality of the situation around him. Arkamani challenged the authority of the priests and the temple and besieged the temple of Amun in Napata. In order to separate his religious authority from his political one. The Kingdom of Kush was suffering from severe weakness due to the control of the clergy over the political life in the country and its events. Kush not only lost hope of regaining its control over Egypt, but also became threatened by the latter after Alexander the Great took control of it. The Kushites abandoned their lands between the first and second cataracts to escape the imminent danger. Arkamani's policy of separating religious and political practices achieved success, and Kush regained its health to stand as a rival to the Ptolemies and to rebuild Lower Nubia, located between the first and second cataracts. Arkamani even contributed to the construction of temples in both Dhaka and Philae in joint work with his Greek counterpart, Ptolemy IV. The strength of the Kushite state, whose rational foundations were laid by Arkamani, was reflected in its ability not only to defend its entity against the sweeping Roman imperial tide, but also in its direct threat to the far southern borders of the Roman Empire, which then became the undisputed master of the world. Do you think that Sudan’s current destiny requires it to return to its past and previous experiences to achieve the hope of building a united, strong Sudan, one great nation for all?
Hence our first question: Mr. Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi began his political career by calling for the separation of religious and political practices, like Arkamani, in his family and sectarian environment. But in 1967, he began to change his rhetoric to adopt the call for an Islamic religious approach to governance. How do you explain that shift?
Mr. Al-Sadiq: In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. First, I welcome this intellectual and cultural effort undertaken by Arkamani, and I say that I am one of the people who most welcome the intellectual vitality with which many Sudanese have rushed and formed many active cultural and intellectual centers inside and outside Sudan. What is noteworthy is that in Sudan it represents a fruitful non-governmental intellectual and cultural activity. In this context, I very much welcome this magazine and its endeavor to clarify the facts about basic issues.
I begin by saying that any attempt to talk about a past that casts its shadow over the present is impossible. From the time of Arkamanian to our present era, humanity has witnessed very new and very different things. The concept of the state, for example, is no longer a concept that contains that kind of unilateral authority. The state is now a people, authorities, agencies, and institutions that are separate from each other, and there is no longer, as it was in the past, that hierarchical concept of authority or the state. The state now, as we said, is something different from it in any period. Second: Religion is no longer that religion in a local sense. Christianity is a global entity and has global institutions, and through these global institutions it influences politics and the state everywhere. Islam is a universal religion. It is self-evident that when we talk about religion now, with the existence of global religions such as Islam and Christianity, we are talking about something different than it was at any time in the past. There is also now greater awareness of the issue of religion. For example, the local traditional religions in Africa, these religions, no matter what is said about them, have a real presence in the psyches and cultures of their adherents.
Modern anthropology, modern sociology, and all these sciences have come with a much greater awareness of the role of culture than in any previous period. The book “Our Creative Human Heritage,” which was issued by UNESCO as a concept to study the effects of human cultures on humans, stresses the importance of human behavior and societies to the point that this report issued in 1996, as I recall, called for the cultural right to be considered an integral part of the human right as the last episode of human rights.
When I called at the beginning of my political career for renewal and reform in the Umma Party, I actually spoke about the conflict that took place based on the need for political authority to be accountable, and the conflict that took place was about the fact that the parliamentary body is the one that should elect and hold the political authority accountable, and it is the one that should choose the candidates for the parliamentary elections. At that time, such talk was revolutionary talk and coincided, in my opinion, with the circumstances of the October Revolution, which I personally believe was an opportunity for the transfer of political influence from one generation to the next, from one generation of pioneers to another generation. In my opinion, the October Revolution represents this transfer from generation to generation and from concepts to concepts. At that time, the Umma Party gave and contributed to this change. There is no doubt in my mind that there was a political and intellectual conflict that arose in Sudan and affected the entire political discourse. This is what led to the emergence of the concepts you asked about related to Islamic orientation... How?
I believed, and still do, that communism brought to Sudan a very important qualitative school, and helped in political enlightenment in Sudan to a very high degree. But I used to say, and I still say, that she linked herself to ideological concepts that were completely different from the environment she was addressing, and therefore she was quick to link development with an ideology that was not appropriate for the environment she was addressing, and she politicized development in the direction of this ideology... The renaissance of women is something that is very much needed considering that it is a kind of modernization, but linking women to the communist transformation or the communist heritage was a big mistake, and so it is for the youth, for the workers, and for the farmers. This was possible as a development, but it was not in the interest of it to be associated with an ideology alien to society. This ideology, which is alien to society, created, in my opinion, fears about the identity of this society, which constituted a window through which the modern Islamic movement entered. The modern Islamic movement was a reaction to this strange thought, but as a reaction it formulated its position in a way that created its political existence. Here, all Sudanese political forces (!) found themselves faced with the necessity of determining their position on this conflict between an incoming communist ideology and a modern Islamic ideology that is also an incoming one, but the second was a reaction to the first. This necessitated the need for what is kept silent to be highlighted, meaning that we, as a Sudanese movement, have a strong religious base, and the role of religion in politics was kept silent and not clearly expressed. This conflict necessitated that there be a prominent expression of what exists in reality and is kept quiet about. This, which exists in the Sudanese reality, is very important in my opinion because Mahdism in Sudan formed a religious conscience that even the British could not free themselves from. The English themselves were very considerate of the religious feelings of the Sudanese for fear of a Mahdist uprising. Therefore, when political parties arose in Sudan, they all (!) had a religious structure that was not known about. When this polarization arose in the Sudanese political-intellectual arena, this silence began to appear. In this appearance, we expressed our Islamic orientation as a reflection of this situation. I believe that we in the Sudanese intellectual and political movement emerged and it is quite apparent that we are based on Islamic religious and Arab cultural principles. This applies to all northern political forces (!). This issue is exacerbated by the fact that colonialism had linked its policy to the Christianization of all non-Islamic and non-Arab Sudanese forces and their groups, and treated Christianity and groups as if they were anti-Arabism and Islam, in a way embodied by the policy of the closed areas. Therefore, when Sudanese graduate intellectuals addressed this fact, they addressed it not only as a statement of facts, but as a reaction to the colonizer’s policy. He formulated a position in the graduates' memorandum in 1942 that they looked forward to overturning this policy and its results. Likewise, when power came to these political leaders, they saw that it was their duty to overturn this policy, considering it to be the policy of colonialism, without taking into account that there are facts. It is true that colonialism exploited them, but there are facts of cultural disparity and religious disparity. Likewise, from the standpoint of activating the religious factor inherent in our formation and from the standpoint of national anti-colonial awareness, in our opinion, we dealt with this issue in a way that did not give other existence any value. This led to all the political and intellectual forces (!) in Sudan, whether from a religious standpoint or a national standpoint, in fact marginalizing and eliminating the role of other identities. This, among other factors, was the factor that most fueled and justified rebellion and armed resistance among people who took up arms.
For us, the starting points from which we started and which, in my opinion, were understood in the sixties according to the background that it provided. The National Islamic Front developed those starting points to the highest possible degree, to the extent that, in my opinion, it led to the maximum degree of reaction in the other direction. This created the polarization that accompanied the rescue regime, which highlighted to us the illogicality of the original position because the Front did not come with this position out of nowhere... it actually came with it as a development of the position on Arab identity in Sudan as the ultimate sovereignty. All we are saying is that instead of the limit being restricted by reality, they have developed it into an imaginary limit. For us, this was a shock, and for others, non-Muslims and non-Arabs, it was a disaster. In light of this, we found ourselves facing the parties complaining about this issue. We are aggrieved to an extent, but they are more aggrieved... We found ourselves discussing this issue together, so I want to say that the current trend has become a third phase. In a first phase, it came, as we said, in the first, and a second phase, and now this is the third phase.
We, as a more likely party, discussed this issue in detail, meaning that we discussed inside Sudan during the days of the democratic regime what this polarization means. If left to it, it will inevitably lead to the division of Sudan because it imposed on Sudan a very narrow identity that does not accommodate everyone. Therefore, I wrote to our brothers abroad based on this memorandum in which I said that it is an urgent necessity that requires laying the foundations for a just peace in Sudan, and that we must acknowledge, Yes, with the religious and cultural difference in Sudan, and we acknowledge the necessity of religious freedom for Muslims and non-Muslims, but we must do this on the basis of respect for citizenship rights because we must take citizenship rights as the basis of a covenant under which religions, cultures, and ethnicities covenant, provided that this is a covenant that brings us all together, a “social contract” within the framework of the covenant of citizenship, and within the framework of respect for this covenant (the limit of the covenant of citizenship), we recognize religious freedom, religious rights, and cultural rights. We wrote to them. Therefore, we need at this stage to agree on a Sudanese bill of rights that becomes the basis that we all respect, despite our different religions. The different religions are committed that whatever the application of its provisions may be, it must not infringe on the rights of citizenship. This was completed at the Nairobi Conference in April 1993. A day came when all parties accepted that, but they only said, “Instead of making a Sudanese human rights document, which we do not have the authority to do, let us take the human rights stipulated in international conventions... We accepted this considering that we are originally connected to them as one of the axioms to which the Sudanese Human Rights Document is added. We consider that we worked on the basis of a common covenant between us and them, in which citizenship is the basis for dealing with them, and that as Muslims we The concept of the covenant exists, and that is why we say that these people have a covenant between us and them, and the covenant does not specify its conditions. The conditions are determined in a common way, because the covenant originally is in fact the law of its signatories. So we are conveying the concept at a time when Islamic religious thought did not accept such a proposal, and therefore we entered into a very basic jurisprudential discussion. There are Sudanese who discount the reality of religion, considering that it does not exist in public life, and therefore they do not see the importance of discussing religious issues. There is a difference between people who have already marginalized religion from public life and people who are committed to religion and are willing to strive to accept political development and religious development... A very, very large debate has arisen. I now believe that the arguments we used are acceptable to the broader spectrum of Islamic thinkers. The arguments were that we are dealing with non-Muslims in Muslim society. What is his classification of this non-Muslim? What they say is that we recognize him as a dhimma because he is under our responsibility as Muslims, and therefore we give him his right as it is the right of a dhimma. We said that this statement stems from the premise that we conquered them and established the state over them. We believe this assumption is wrong. These non-Muslim people who live with us have the same rights and duties as those with the same status. Therefore, we do not deal with them as if they are under our protection, but rather as a covenant between us and them. For us as Muslims, the concept of the covenant exists and is defined in a common way. The majority of people were wrong about us, but we succeeded in converting a large part of Islamic opinion to accept citizenship as a basis, and we even gave a dimension to accepting international legitimacy, the right to citizenship, and the international system.
Here came the talk about then what next?
In 1994, I wrote a second memorandum indicating that it must be recognized that the issue of religion and politics needs to be resolved. We do not like to talk about loose concepts. Let us talk about the state in terms of central powers instead of names such as federalism or confederation. We talk about the peaceful transfer of power so that it is guaranteed to all organizations and is open to all citizens, and no group receives privileges because of religious affiliation. Let's start writing reality and then people choose from the labels what they see. On this basis, we wrote the Asmara courses... The Asmara courses represent an advanced stage. With the disagreement that occurred within the assembly, we declared that, despite our disagreement with the assembly on certain issues, which was renewed in 1999, we consider ourselves obligated and committed to everything we signed in the last stage, especially the decisions on crucial issues. After my return to Sudan, we, as political forces, affirmed this commitment, and in the last episode of development on this issue, we appealed to the government to sign the Asmara decisions so that we could close the discussion on this issue and continue discussing other matters.
The point I want to reach from all of this discussion is that we are in intellectual and political work that does not start in a vacuum, and for each of the different stages there is a realistic framework around it that explains its requirements. We believe that what is at issue now is controlling the relationship of religion with the state, and controlling the relationship of religion and politics within the framework of the modern state and within the framework of global religions. This control must take into account very specific facts: the first fact is the right to citizenship, the second fact is public freedoms, the third fact is human freedom, and the fourth fact is international legitimacy. We believe that these facts are the required internal and external climate in which the relationship between religion and the state can be controlled.
Arkamani: There is a specific point regarding the issue of jurisprudence regarding legislation regarding southerners and people of the covenant. Of course, it is noted that, based on inherited religious literature, southerners are viewed as people of dhimma, and on the basis that those who sign agreements, whether in areas that were conquered by force, peace, or the like, are considered people of peace, but some obligations are imposed on them. Or do you not see that there is some kind of imbalance between this and citizenship rights for our brothers in the south or in some other regions?
Mr. Al-Sadiq: We say that our covenant is essentially the same as a covenant of citizenship.
Arkamani: Era of Citizenship!!
Mr. Al-Sadiq: Yes, citizenship itself becomes the covenant.
Arkamani: How? In their understanding...
Mr. Al-Sadiq (interrupting): No, in our understanding.
Arkamani: But when they return to Elia and ancient literature...
Mr. Al-Sadiq (interrupting): No, no, no, we are not talking about ancient literature.
Arkamani: As soon as they remain members of the Dhimma or people of the covenant, they return...
Mr. Al-Sadiq (interrupting): Perfect... Perfect, you and I agree on the necessity of defining concepts. We talk about us and them. When we are in a covenant, we are equal in this covenant. We are also, for them, people of the covenant. The basic idea is that we shift the concept from them being under our protection to that we are together... we and they are under the nation’s protection. I can understand very well that some people get mixed up with Islamic concepts and think that this will cast a shadow on them, but when I tell you the four controls: citizenship rights, human rights, public freedoms, and international legitimacy... well, that is sufficient confirmation that we are talking about another world, not this world here.
Arkamani: For us, it may be a concept, but for them... let us try to understand the equation, meaning the necessity of framing the concept completely: They are under our responsibility as well, we are under their responsibility...
Mr. Al-Sadiq: This concept is over. We are talking about the covenant of citizenship between us and them. They must understand that when they talk to a Sudanese who is not committed to religious matters, he can speak “as he pleases,” but when they talk to a Sudanese who adheres to religious matters, he must justify his effort in speaking, otherwise he will be a hypocrite. On this basis, as I said, we will refer such concepts to a constitution, law, and courts... The constitution, law, and courts are what determine rights and duties. I believe that it is very legitimate for them to have a misunderstanding because it results from a background in which these considerations exist, but we are talking about that we want everything to become clear, in accordance with the constitution and the law, and protected by the courts.
Arkamani: There is an issue raised that Mr. Sadiq al-Mahdi has a hidden tendency to have a form of religious state. It is true that the “Islamic Awakening” project may be somewhat different from the “civilizational project,” but in the end the two projects reach the same goal of establishing a form of religious state, and then some link this hidden tendency to Mr. Al-Sadiq’s adherence to his charismatic personality, which is based, according to Max Weber’s definition of the charismatic personality, “on leadership that represents a kind of relationship between the leader and his followers, which exists when the followers consider the leader a “supernatural personality” and accept His words and actions without hesitation, they respond unconditionally to the leader’s directives and give him a firm emotional commitment.” The truthful master, in his subconscious, feels that his charismatic leadership derived from the Mahdist heritage will find continuity only in the case of a form of religious state.. What is your comment on such a hypothesis?
Mr. Al-Sadiq: Yes... My comment on this is first that the most powerful charismatic figures arose outside the religious framework... Stalin, Gandhi, Hitler, Museveni, and Castro, yes. Therefore, the charismatic personality is not always linked to religion. It is, in fact, a “positivism.” Secondly, Islam exists in the Sudanese political, intellectual, cultural and social reality. It is true that this truth has fallen to some secular Sudanese, but it has fallen into their minds...and they are a minority. In the Sudanese reality, Islam has its status. Likewise, in the Sudanese reality, Ansariism has weight. The choice is not to cancel these things or commit to them, but the choice is in the type of commitment. If we do not strive with an enlightened Islamic concept, the Islamic center will be occupied by incompetent movements that act like what happened in Afghanistan. If Islam does not play an enlightened role, it will play a withdrawn role, and the same thing applies to the Ansar, if an enlightened leadership does not come, a backward leadership will come. We cannot in any arbitrary way rule out the role of Ansarism and Islam. Indeed, if we deny these things, we will provoke a reaction. In my opinion, all the extremist movements in Algeria, Egypt, and Afghanistan, wherever there were attempts to exclude religion, there was a reaction... and therefore the results are counterproductive. The objective truth is that when we abolish it, we provoke it. Therefore, we must search for a mechanism to control it while preserving other rights such as citizenship and public freedoms. A truth that we want to preserve, but without eradicating the religious other. Therefore, I say in a simple summary that we affirm the existence of objective facts that we cannot jump over. We must respect those objective facts, and I consider myself an Arab and a Muslim and I have no doubts about that and I have no hesitation, but my role as an Arab and a Muslim pushes me to control this in my life so that I respect the rights of citizenship, respect the democratic decision, respect the freedoms of others, and also respect other cultures. It is better for them to deal with someone like me than to look for isolated people to sell them goods they are unable to deliver, and instead of finding themselves dealing with people who react, i.e. extremists. They have the choice of dealing with those who are aware of the era and its concepts and are ready to recognize and embrace rights, or to search for minorities that declare to them that they have erased Arabism, erased Islam, and eliminated everything, and they have only erased it in their minds, but they cannot actually erase it. On the contrary, if they establish a political system, this will provoke a very strong reaction in the opposite direction, which is what brings war, as it were. I believe that we must pave the way for moderate thinking that leads to accommodating objective facts in a way that allows an opportunity for the modern state, citizenship rights, religious rights, human rights, and international legitimacy, and closes the door to those who, in my opinion, provoke these elements, as provoking them will lead to a reaction. In any case, we do not tell people to follow us, but we tell them to understand what your disagreement with us is about.
Arkamani: There is a very important point related to the Sudanese reality or even the Arab reality. In the proposal that you have just discussed about the issue of Arabism and Islam and the existing understanding, this approach of thinking may make this approach closer to the nationalist proposal than to the fundamentalist proposal. By the latter, I mean the front’s proposal. With this understanding, is it not permissible to classify you in a category that puts you further away from the claim that you are closer to the idea or fundamentalist thought? This is because it seems to me that your proposal is closer to the proposals of the nationalist movement and all its factions. Whether the Nasserists or the Baathists about the relationship of Arabism to Islam?
Mr. Al-Sadiq: I believe that I would like to be free from classifications. For example, if we look at the issue of fundamentalism, I think that what I am saying is closer to the Medina newspaper that the Prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) created in Medina.. Ok, is there more fundamentalism than the Prophet?? Therefore, I say that foreign relations should be established on the basis of international legitimacy. I believe that the fundamentalism they are talking about now are reactions that occurred at a stage in the development of the Islamic State, and therefore I accuse it of wanting to revive a historical reality in the modern era without justification. Therefore, I believe that it is in fact rejected as representing an extinct historical stage, and that our words represent the correct Islamic understanding. This is a struggle in Islamic thought that we are waging, and we do not recognize these Islamic extremists except that they constitute an understandable reaction in certain historical circumstances.. Now it is incomprehensible.
Arkamani: In the interview conducted with you by Brother Yasser Arman, “New Paths Magazine, Issue 1, 1998,” you referred to the Sudanese movement as “a unilateral trend that sees the establishment of a Sudanese identity that excludes all other identities and establishes a secular system that expels all different identities in order to establish what can be called a Sudanese identity.” Based on such a perspective, you have come to describe the New Sudan project, which is in fact the project of the old, renewed Sudanese left adopted by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the National Democratic Rally, as a project that expels all identities and seeks to establish a unilateral identity, and then your repeated claim that Garang is trying to replace the Arab identity with an African-centric identity, etc. Do you not agree with me that such a hypothesis that you propose starts from an inverted position in presenting the issue in a serious scientific manner... that is, by insisting on the question “What is the goal of the topic?” (which often gives an answer that represents a hypothesis that needs to be proven) instead of asking the question with scientific accuracy “What are the reasons that led to the emergence of the topic?” (which will give a more scientific answer to the problem and then explore the depths of the ultimate goals of the proposed solution).
Mr. Al-Sadiq: Since we cannot talk about Garang’s movement without also talking about its current reality... it talks, for example, about secularism, and we know the role of the Christian religion in it in all respects. Christianity is a fundamental political force, and this does not mean that we want to be against it, we just want to deal with reality. Christianity now has a global political, intellectual and diplomatic presence... Talking about secularism in Sudan is understood as if you are talking about the marginalization and exclusion of Islam... So what about Christianity as long as it has money and political power... The Vatican is a religious state... This does not mean that we do not want to deal with it, that is, we have to deal with reality. Many people, when they talk about keeping religion out of politics, think that they are only talking about Islam and Ansarism. No, here is a very large political force that has great control, and Garang is not far from this role. That is to say, he opens their meetings with prayers and speaks from religious pulpits, and in 1998 he spoke from the pulpit of the International Christian Solidarity Organization. And so on. We acknowledge this reality. The Christian religion has a presence here. We control the relationship between religion and politics. Yes! We regulate the relationship between religion and the state...yes! But there is a close relationship between the Christian religion, Christian political forces, and the John Garang movement.
Secondly, Garang’s movement now cannot talk about the situation without how it is managing the areas it controls in Sudan... These areas are being managed on a military basis and it is very clear that there is a military administration that does not differ in any clear way from what we complain about from the dictatorship of the National Islamic Front. That means we are facing a situation in which there is a dictatorship and in which there is a role for the Christian religion, just as there is a dictatorship and an Islamic state here. We are not talking about this better or different alternative. We want to talk about standards that we agree on by which we can develop the situation in the two places (meaning the south and the north - Arkamani). But there are some northern politicians who believe that we should postpone this talk because we are in a battle with the National Islamic Front and we should not talk about these things because that is very dangerous because it means that you want to wash away blood with blood. We must think about what concepts are required to develop all this talk in the direction of controlling Christianity and Islam and establishing democracy. This is our issue with Garang. We do not have a second issue. We do not want to cancel our recognition of the problem. We do not want to deny our agreement and break what we signed. But we do not want our country to remain captive to a wrong approach.
Arkamani: There seems to be a lack of clarity in your use of the term secularism. In the English language, the term “secular” is used, which literally means “worldly,” “non-religious,” “civil,” “not affiliated with a monastic order.” In this sense, it was stated in the Declaration of the Principles of IGAD (Article 6): “The establishment of a secular, democratic, civil state, separating religion from the state, provided that personal status laws are in accordance with religious laws and noble beliefs.”
Mr. Al-Sadiq (interrupting): No...no
Arkamani: This term secularism is the one you insist on translating as secularism
Mr. Al-Sadiq: No. In fact, there is no talk about secularism or a religious state. It is six points. Do you have this document?
Arkamani: What document are you referring to?
Mr. Al-Sadiq: Which we signed.
Arkamani: I am not referring to Asmara, but rather the word “secularism” mentioned in Clause 6 of IGAD’s principles. When Garang stresses the secular civil state, does he mean to define a position against religion? I mean, I mean to say...
Mr. Al-Sadiq: Therefore, we say, let us stay away from words. Words lead to mazes
Arkamani: You pointed out that Garang deals with religion
Mr. Al-Sadiq: Of course, today we say in the definition that you are a Christian or a Muslim. The Church is the largest political party in the West... Whoever does not know this fact does not understand anything... But the fact that the constitutions in the West act as a controlling force, yes, this is a fact. Clinton was brought by the church, this Bush was brought by the church...so how!
Arkamani: Based on what is happening in the south, according to what you presented, the question arises: If the Popular Movement carries weapons, and the opposition group carries weapons, and you were at one time within the group and carried weapons at the same time that your party worked inside Sudan, and Dr. Hassan al-Turabi was in the leadership of the regime... you met him in Geneva and you as a party are still in the group... the government did not blame this meeting. But when Al-Turabi signed a memorandum of understanding with Garang, he accused the former of treason... In fact, it seems that there is a complete lack of control...
Mr. Al-Sadiq: I think there is complete clarity... We met Al-Turabi in Geneva as a representative of the regime and not as an isolated person... as a person who represents the regime, and I met him in the context of searching for a political solution... And so all our meetings continued until the last meeting with Garang in Abuja... Meetings with a clear goal... We want a political solution and we are looking for a political solution. Therefore, the thing that provided protection from an adverse reaction to these communications was the clarity of our goal, the clarity of our means, and the conviction of all parties that this is what we are doing. The memorandum of understanding that was concluded between the People's Movement and the First People's Congress did not contain any talk about a political solution, seeking a political solution, or cooperation for a political solution. Secondly, there was talk about activating counter-opposition action. Here there is an alliance between opposition civil political forces and opposition military forces for a common goal. This sparked a reaction. Thirdly, Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi, when he referred to what was agreed upon, said that there are hidden clauses. This means, undoubtedly, revolutionary clauses that were not announced. Therefore, in my opinion, it exposed the agreement to negative reactions from the regime. It is true that I believe that it does not amount to legal accountability, but it could form the basis for a political reaction.
Arkamani: In your opinion, how serious is Hassan al-Turabi in what he signed? A political tactic or a real change in his position?
Mr. Al-Sadiq: By God, I think that there are two facts: The first fact is that Al-Turabi’s ideological agenda has fallen, and I believe that to this extent there is nothing positive. But I believe that in this agreement, Al-Turabi wanted to increase the chances of confronting the regime, and I do not absolve this agreement of being short-sighted because we are at a stage in which we need a kind of deeper thinking than simply opening a new front in which contradictory parties meet. When this meeting began, this was my comment. This is evidence of the fall of the ideological project, but the political concept behind it indicates a short-sighted consideration.
Arkamani: The current Islamic political system in Sudan has proven that the ruling elite relies strongly on domestic indoctrination and symbolism to ensure the consolidation of its economic and political power and offers a system of rewards that differs from what rational civil societies offer. In the existing Islamic political system in Sudan, the ruling elite controls the masses through a mixture of spiritual and material rewards and a series of spiritual, economic, and physical punishments. Now you are calling for reconciliation with this elite. How will you reconcile your call with what you signed in Asmara regarding the equitable redistribution of wealth and you have repeatedly declared your commitment to it... knowing that this elite has reached the point of seeking to preserve its interests to mobilize men and children to go voluntarily or forcibly to the battle fronts against its opponents by imbibing them with promises of paradise as martyrs and material bliss if God decrees for them a life?
Mr. Al-Sadiq: First, all the forces controlling the situation in the Soviet Union and in South Africa tried to establish themselves economically, and when they were forced to conclude a political agreement, they all accepted a review of the economic equation. Regarding this system, our words are clear. First, there must be nationalism of the national economy, and there must be nationalism in state institutions, whether civil or non-civil. We agree on this and we agree on how to implement it. Secondly, any type of party control over state institutions must be prevented. There must also be a clear separation between the ruling National Congress party and state institutions so that it becomes one of the parties that accepts free elections and accepts the results of these elections.
The words are clear and they, in my opinion, agree to this. It is true that the agreement may be theoretical with no practical response, and this depends on our intelligence as negotiators... to draw up a clear, detailed and precise agreement... and put in place a mechanism to ensure implementation. Therefore, we speak with the other political forces and tell them that when we walked abroad and saw that there was no room except outside, this was due to specific circumstances... there was a complete prevention of any movement inside the country and no recognition of pluralism... and the regime was almost at war with the neighbors, which made the neighbors Stand with us at no cost. So we are in a situation in which we very much agree to work from the outside and benefit first from the conditions of internal tyranny and the conditions of external détente. But there was a development in the regime’s discourse. This development led to a margin of freedom at home and led to the regime entering into bilateral agreements with neighboring countries. These bilateral agreements began to end the state of confrontation and search for conditions for coexistence with them. We have become a pressure card. The Sudanese opposition has become a pressure card for these countries to achieve bilateral interests in dealing with the regime. This is not a national role. Therefore, we appealed to all people to consider the stage over, and if it continues, the political forces will unfortunately be pressure cards in order to achieve interests against the regime. As long as there is a margin of freedom, the national duty calls for us to go in and try to activate the work from within, and that what actually happened had previously happened to previous regimes. It happened to Abboud and it happened to the two Nimeiri. They entered a stage in which there was a large margin of freedom. To activate political action. Of course, this does not mean that past experiences must be repeated, because at this stage it is very likely that the regime will enter into agreements with the political forces, if they are serious and aware, with regional and international guarantees that achieve democratic transformation without what happened in May or during the Abboud era. We constantly and publicly say that this regime must either unite with the people in achieving the goal or unite the people against it. This is a new stage and the people must wash their hands of the past stage and enter a new stage. This is with the exception of the Popular Movement, which is more of an army than a movement. Therefore, we say that the Popular Movement or the People’s Army is allowed to continue until a political agreement occurs, but we do not ask for it to do what we did. We are political forces who used to create military wings for ourselves... Now have come the conditions of salvation for us to take off our clothes and swim from land to land. The other.
Arkamani: The popular movement is also a political force
Mr. Al-Sadiq: The People’s Army is a reality. First, second, third, and tenth, it is an army. The Popular Movement, in my opinion, is the public relations organization of the People’s Army, and it will continue to be an army until a political agreement is reached. This is logical talk. As for the Democratic Unionist Party, the Communist Party, etc., these are political parties that enter the country throughout the country to activate political work and to activate the political front. Anyone can say, “By God, in Problems... but now there are developments. The judiciary has begun to take very strong positions and the press is very excellent... There is political activity... which the political leaders are doing. In the end, this will either lead to a political agreement or lead to polarization if the regime reneges.
Arkamani: The truth is that all the main leadership of the opposition parties are already present at home and carry out their activities openly and secretly.
Mr. Al-Sadiq: I say that the main characters are necessary because we want to make a change. We are starting from certain locations and the locations from which we are starting are themselves changing. Why do we assume that they are otherwise? Especially now the oppositions within them are all bellowing the same thing that we are saying.
Arkamani: Scientific research is the basis for the renaissance of peoples. Don't you think that we have not applied this saying in Sudan in the required manner, despite the availability of qualified cadres? Do you not see that this shortcoming is one of the reasons that led to the creation of the political problem, meaning that if we had emphasized the study of identity scientifically and provided scientific studies based on the reality of the diverse Sudanese cultures, that would have been better than this political debate and launching loose things about it without arriving at real statistical facts.. Therefore, the issue of heritage is important in mainland Sudan, but the current political trends make us fear that what the Taliban did with the Buddhist statues will happen in Sudan!! As we remember, when we were in charge of the Antiquities Department, we received frightening messages after 1989 suggesting opening the stomachs of the huge statues in the museum, whether inside the exhibition hall or displayed in the garden of the National Museum of Antiquities, so that the viewer sees that there are no gutters inside them, in line with Sharia law...
Mr. Al-Sadiq: The Taliban are people with a low level of culture and public awareness, and in fact these people were linked to foreign intelligence services.. Therefore, this is a completely fabricated story. The National Movement of the Islamic Front is a Sudanese movement, and it has its own decisions, and is made up of leaders who are aware of the culture of the time and public work. Therefore, this is a fundamental disagreement between it and the Taliban. Secondly, I believe that we are now in a new phase, the phase of the decline of ideological fanaticism itself. There are many people who have read the 1998 constitution, both Sudanese and non-Sudanese. I tell you, they all think that the Egyptian, Libyan, or Iraqi constitution is more Islamic than the Front’s constitution, at least because they stipulate that the religion of the state is Islam and Sharia is the main source of rulings. So we are in a different situation, and now there are opportunities for all these concepts to be reversed. I mean, now in Khartoum there is the Muhammad Omar Bashir Center, the Abdul Karim Mirghani Center, and the Sudanese Studies Center, which recently moved from Cairo... That means there are very many centers that work on the basis of modernity, science, and knowledge. There are universities and institutions now, Computer Man, the Institute of Technology. There are many things in which there is very great development... grandchildren, and the dean’s symposium on grandchildren. These are all voluntary institutions outside the government that work in the field of research, intellectual and political work. Therefore, I believe that we want to strengthen this trend to develop scientific, intellectual, and political research... When Osama spoke about this magazine, I told him that I believe that people must continue the journey and search for a formula to form an association or center that includes not only archaeologists and anthropologists, but all those interested in heritage, with the aim of developing the concept of awareness about research into antiquities and cultures, and to combat regressive ideas by all means.
Arkamani: There is, in fact, a point of view that expresses, from a jurisprudential standpoint, the great contradiction between what the National Islamic Front claims to adhere to in terms of provisions and the method by which it seized power. Jurisprudentially, do you not think that the application of the punishment for armed robbery and robbery should apply to those who go out at night armed with tanks and plunder the government? Is it permissible to negotiate with him according to Islamic law? The fact is that if we develop this concept jurisprudentially, we can protect the entire Islamic region from the evils of military coups.
Mr. Al-Sadiq: The military does not come because there are no sanctions, but for other reasons. I believe that now the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity have established something similar to a charter requiring assistance to democracies. This is a development. We need two things: a successful democratic government, and means of deterring any coup, and this is a necessary condition.
Arkamani: Because the Charter did not protect democracy
Mr. Al-Sadiq: The Charter does not protect it. It needs a successful democracy and correct procedures as well. It is true that in the days of the Cold War, conditions provided protection for coups by this or that pole. Now there is the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, and there is a lot of talk about not recognizing any military coup.
Arkamani: Finally, there are two issues that occupy the Arab and international streets: the Palestinian issue and the siege imposed on the people of Iraq.
Mr. Al-Sadiq: Quite simply, I believe that the existing extremism in Israel has closed the door to fruitful discussion of peace, because this extremism led to two things: it strengthened the argument of opposing extremist opinion on the one hand, and defeated moderation in the two camps on the other hand. For some time now, I have been saying that the international community must recognize the fact that the Israeli state is not a natural plant in the region. The problem of Zionism is a European problem resulting from the European persecution of the Jews and not an Arab-Islamic problem. We acknowledge that the Jews were persecuted and we acknowledge that the Zionist movement is a political movement...an organization of work based on a reality, but this reality is not Arab and not Islamic, but rather a European reality, and according to this reality Israel was established with international support, through which the owners of this land were removed. There is no solution to this problem except an international solution. In the opinion of the international community, as it created the problem, it must solve it on a just basis as long as the same assumption on which Israel was based, considering this land without a people, has proven to the Palestinian people the invalidity of this assumption. Okay, you did it based on the assumption of a hero, so there must be a way to deal with reality. The international community is required to impose a just solution to this problem, and until this happens, very violent confrontations will occur between Israeli extremism and the Arab and Palestinian reaction that will be faced militarily.
Regarding the Iraqi issue, I believe that the siege of Iraq does not achieve the international goals behind it. Rather, it has turned into a kind of punishment imposed on the Iraqi people and has not affected the direction of the international goals in this area. I believe that the solution is that there should in fact be an Arab solution in order for an Arab system to ensure the security of the Gulf states and the protection of their interests, taking into account that the international solution, in my opinion, from now on no longer has any role in achieving security in the region or achieving an interest. This absence of an Arab solution opens the door to harmful international agendas. Therefore, the Arab trend now must be directed to lifting the siege on Iraq and the presence of an Arab initiative that achieves Gulf security and closes the door to international initiatives and agendas, as they have become without a role.
Arkamani: Many thanks to Mr. Al-Sadiq for the frankness and intellectual freedom that characterized this meeting, and our best wishes to him.