In general, the British administration took a year

(7)

(7/1) Anzan, of course, does not criticize the fact that British colonialism played a direct, intentional role in perpetuating and exacerbating the problem. However, our point of difference is that he did not (create it), so there is no point in focusing on his role alone as in our yawning ruminations of some unthinking trader. Indeed, some writers now do not hide their explicit tendency to identify colonialism with the followed social cultural center of the Mozarabs, in connection with the competition for the resulting social cultural margin (Abakar Adam Ismail, 1999). Despite the bitterness of this conclusion, or the exaggeration that may appear in it, the British, in fact, relied on this stupidity of “subordination”, and on the historical memory of slavery, and on the inherited “puzzles” of plundering resources as practiced by the “jellaba” since the sixteenth century, as previously mentioned, to establish, in a way that serves their colonial strategies, historical ethnic conditions in which they found the Sudanese when they entered the country. They have formulated and implemented the “Southern Policy” since the early 1920s, through a series of laws and arrangements aimed at curbing rapprochement, not acculturation, between the country’s different ethnic groups in the north and south and the eastern and western Nuba Mountains, such as the Passports and Licensing Law of 1922 AD, the Closed Areas Law of 1929 AD, and the Tribal Leaders’ Courts Law of 1931 AD, in addition to imposing English as the official language. In the south, setting the weekend on Sunday, prohibiting its people from wearing northern fashions, sending southern students to complete their education in Uganda, and so on. If we assumed, theoretically, the possibility of excluding the colonial factor, do you think that the causes of the problem would have been eliminated given the subjective status of ethnic relations and their process since the sixteenth century?! This, in our opinion, is the question that needs new thinking.

(7/2) In general, the British administration took a decision in 1946 AD to change that policy after less than three decades had passed since its implementation. It held the Juba Conference in June 1947 AD to approve the alternative policy that kept the south within the borders of a unified Sudan with an autonomous system. Then, the Legislative Assembly was formed in December 1948 AD with the participation of southerners. It is assumed that Dr. Osama Abdel-Rahman Elnur, in an attempt to give a scientific explanation for that change from a different angle, stated that it must have occurred in the circumstances of the impact caused by the development of anthropology and the revolution in the foundations of ethnography, or what became known in Britain as classical anthropology. British social anthropology had achieved a major breakthrough in conjunction with the beginnings of the colonial era in the period 1860-1880 with the emergence of the works of the pioneering evolutionary school such as (Mother's Right) by Bachofen, (Primitive Society) by Taylor, and (Kinship Systems and Ancient Society) by Morgan, in addition to the works of others such as Mayne and Liebuck. All of them, consciously or not, provided the theorizing that colonialism needed, with the exception of Morgan, who took a distinct position on urbanization and on the entire bourgeois system in the nineteenth century, before anthropology became a special science, in the stage of field research, independent of the needs of colonialism, and succeeded, albeit relatively, in influencing its ideology (Osama Abdel-Rahman Elnur, 2001). Osama Abdel-Rahman Elnur,

(7/3) Whatever the case, Sudan entered the stage after the self-government agreement in February 1953 AD and is (unified), and entered the post-independence stage in January 1956 AD and is (unified). This would not have happened had the southern representatives not voted in favor of the declaration of the independence of (unified) Sudan from within the first parliament on 12/19/1955, in exchange for a (word of honour), just a (word of honour) from the political forces in the north to meet their longings for federal rule after independence! If we had fulfilled our promise, this could have been a model for dealing directly with the longings of (others) both Nuba and non-Nuba over the past fifty years. Do you see us now mourning the “Achilles’ heel” of what happened on this long, thorny “Path of Pain,” which we were forced to cross barefoot, since we broke our oath one dusty day, and until a time came upon us in which “others” no longer believed anything we said except with foreign guarantees?!

(8)

(8/1) The Muslim Musta’rab intelligentsia (the Jellaba) has taken on the leadership of the northern political movement since before the period of political independence. Throughout that history, these elites, primarily their (rationalist/theistic) movement, with its various schools of thought and political affiliations, did not stop proposing various theses on the issue of identity. However, because the difficulties of knowing (the other), which the (authoritarian/deconstructive) movement does not care about at all, and which for the first movement exist in the barrier of language, culture, and belief, often constitute a temptation to rely on what is common about this (the other) in the public mind, these theses continued to collide every time with these difficulties, which made most of them surrender to the ease of interpretations that they envisioned as mere “artificial barriers erected by the colonialists to divide the single country” (Mohamed Fawzi Mustafa, 1972 AD), that is, a pure colonial conspiracy that blocked the way for Sudanese African ethnicities, especially in the south, to join the Arabization and Islamization movement, which completed its ideal model, according to this angle of view, in the north and center. Thus, in the face of the difficulties of national construction after independence in 1956 AD, and with the impetus of the Arab League and the Islamic organizations to which Sudan belonged after independence, it was entrusted with the task of Arabizing and Islamizing Africans on the principle of oppression and domination (Abdullah Ali Ibrahim, 1996), and because laxity leads to more of it, most of these theses were emptied, despite their diverse starting points, especially among the traditional forces that inherited power from Colonialism, in official programs and policies as follows:

A/ Arabic was declared an official language, in what some critics of this policy called “linguistic algebra” (same source). This constituted a waste of all the country’s wealth in terms of linguistic diversity and bilingualism, as there are representatives of all the large African linguistic groups in Sudan, except for the Khoisan languages ​​in South Africa (Sayyed Hamid Hariz - Daman Abdullah Ali Ibrahim, 2001). According to the 1956 census, the languages ​​spoken by the people of Sudan amount to one hundred and fourteen languages, of which the share of the population of South Sudan is about fifty languages. 51% of the total population of 10,262,536 spoke Arabic, 17.7% spoke Nilotic languages ​​(11% of them Dinka), and 12.1% spoke languages ​​other than Arabic in the north and center (same source). Joseph Greenberg classified all major language groups in Africa into four families. With the exception of the Khoisan family, the other three families are all endemic to Sudan, which are: the Afro-Asian language family, including Arabic and Bejawi, the Niger-Kordovan language family, including the Nuba, Kwalib, Moro, and Fulani languages, and the Nilotic-Saharan language family, of which Sudan is considered the ideal home for all its branches, and it is a feature that is not available in any other country in Africa. More than 70% of the local languages ​​spoken in Sudan belong to this family, and some of them even enjoy a significant position on the country’s linguistic map in terms of the number of their speakers and the extent of their geographical spread, such as the Nubian language group in the Nuba Mountains, northern Sudan, New Halfa, the Nilotic language group, the Fur language, and the Zaghawa language, for example (Al-Amin Abu Manqa; Al-Adwaa 2/16/2004). The importance of the languages ​​of this family is increasing for Sudan in that it shares a number of them with all neighboring countries. Rather, its linguistic map includes Nilo-Saharan languages ​​migrating from distant countries in West Africa, such as the Songhai language prevailing in Mali and Niger, and the Kanuri language prevailing in Borno (Nigeria), Niger and Chad. The importance of such facts lies in that they indicate the depth of the historical ties between Sudan and its near and distant neighbors, and they also constitute an important element in Sudanese communication with these peoples (same source).

B/ Just as it happened, in internal affairs, the ease of drawing up policies that ultimately revolve around the center of one religion (Islam), one language, and one culture (Arabic), which excluded all peoples of cultural and linguistic pluralism and diversity, considering language in particular as a carrier of culture, and turned it into a mere target for Islamization and Arabization, so too, in external affairs, it was easy to bet, with a one-dimensional eye, on including all of Sudan under slogans. (Arabism), (Arab nationalism), (Arab unity), and so on, and considering all of this as the only historical (possibility) available to solve the problem of (Sudanese unity), but its disastrous adverse effect is that it turns, in the mind of the non-Arabized (other), into mere symbols that are self-sufficient to despair of this (unity), and stimulate the tendency (to secede), which prompted some Arab thinkers, even those who believe that “Arab nationalism...is still a living force.” And a move,” because they ring the alarm bells about this “Qatari peculiarity... in Arab nationalist thinking, and the example it presents to that thought is something it desperately needs” (Elijah Hariq; Introduction to: Abdullah Ali Ibrahim, 1996). The truth is that Arab nationalist thought “dealt with... that problem with some lightness, if not hostility... (and) ignoring or underestimating... claiming... that minorities do not differ in opinion from the general nationalist approach... (but) the right path for Arab nationalism today... is to respect the existing differences in society and the Qatari state and help it integrate, grow and prosper so that it can... build the national structure that is based on the base of units of the Qatari states. Instead of... We seek to eliminate the Qatari state and its specialties, so it is better for us to work to celebrate it and rely on its capabilities, as it is the foundation from which we rise towards the highest national building” (same source).

(8/2) In fact, there are intellectual preliminaries for that simplification that were crystallized, before independence, by the prevailing trends and tendencies in the thought and culture of the Muslim Musta’rabs, the national movement in general, and the intelligentsia (the Jellaba) in particular. In the year 1921 AD. Sheikh Abdullah Abdul Rahman Al-Amin dedicated his book (Arabic in Sudan) to prove the (purity) of the Arabic language in (all) Sudan! In the same direction, poetry, which at that time represented the main image of thought, took off, through birthdays, graduate events, and various religious and social occasions. Perhaps the irony is most clearly evident here in that, while Ali Abdel Latif, a Nubian father and mother Denkawi, was leading the national movement in the aftermath of World War I, its greatest poet Khalil Farah, a Nubian by origin, was singing glorifying the national revolutionaries as:

Sons of Ya'arub, where Rabia's glory is

And the sons of the island where Iyad's glory was!

In 1941 AD, Muhammad Ahmad Mahjoub, who was one of the most prominent intellectuals of that era and later became one of the most distinguished leaders of political thought in the Umma Party, and one of the distinguished leaders who held the ministry, set the conditions for the ideal of the intellectual movement “in this country,” as he put it, that “it should respect the teachings of the true Islamic religion, have an Arab appearance in its linguistic expression, and be inspired by the ancient and modern (history) of the people of this country and the (traditions).” (its people). This is how we can create (national) literature, and this literary movement will later turn into a political movement leading to political, social and cultural independence.” It goes without saying, of course, that Al-Mahjoub did not see in all the countries anything but the (history), (culture), and (language) of the Arab Muslims alone! The return of Imam Sadiq al-Mahdi, head of the Umma Party, after more than half a century, has, without a doubt, a special significance in this context, to criticize what he called (cultural unilateralism) among the popular political forces that ruled Sudan after independence, which led to severe religious and cultural polarizations (the paper “Different Identities...”, previous source).

C/ Although Sudan has not sometimes participated in some Arab organizations due to its peripheral status, or because the issue of Arabism has not been resolved there (Muhammad Omar Bashir, 1991), Arabism and the Islamic religion have nevertheless become entrenched, not as a “tent” that is hoped to accommodate the issue of “unity” as much as it accommodates the natural acculturation movement among the components of Sudanese pluralism, but rather as an oppressive ideology in the hands of the intellectual and political “jellaba” elites. Thus, the trend of Arabization and Islamization expanded economically, politically, socially, and culturally, making Islam the sole framework for the system of values in all countries, and Arabic the sole medium for the press, radio, television, government offices, and educational curricula. Society was also “framed... on those foundations... (which) hindered... opportunities for minorities that do not conform to the prevailing model in the areas of self-development... and... formed a psychological/authoritarian barrier... In the face of any review...of internal affairs, it is thought that it might affect the essence of Arab belonging” (Youssef Mukhtar Al-Amin,2002). The matter was further complicated by the inability of these elites to achieve the required amount of comprehensive development and establish a system of governance that meets the aspirations of the majority. In light of the conditions of backwardness, the deterioration of the economy and living conditions, and the high rates of population growth, the hotbeds of ethnic, regional and cultural conflict expand automatically, which is manifested in the adoption of political and cultural positions that differ from the prevailing, by taking up arms against the central authority, and igniting civil wars and tribal conflicts whose dimensions and effects worsen day after day (same source).

(8/3) Because (other) cultures are not compatible with the context, and may even cause confusion, they have been excluded in practice most of the time, as in the cases of religion and language, or they have been attempted forcibly assimilated in (the best!) circumstances, in the manner of French colonialism (!). It is sufficient to point out, among the multitude of current models, which are countless, to two shining examples:

A/ The first model is represented by the Folklore Troupe during the days of May, where performances from the East, West, and South often coincided with the rhythms and movements of the North and Center as an alleged symbolization of (a claimed unity), so the stage turns into a (superfluous) tourist (generator) with costumes, colors, and animal skins on the bodies of the male and female dancers, and types of beads, skewers, and thongs on their necks, wrists, and legs, before it takes place from the beginning of During the past nineties, they were “hidden” by conforming to “Islamic dress,” or “absent” by banning their performances permanently. May God protect the believers from fighting!

B/ The second model is represented by what is known as (the National Orchestra!) and (the Palmo Band). As for the first, its leader himself, Dr., sufficed. Al-Fatih Hussein, Ma'on, proving that it does not reflect the totality of Sudanese musical cultures, and therefore it is not nationalistic or sad (Al-Sahafa, 4/18/04). As for the other, I expressed my fear about a quarter of a century ago (SUDANOW, February 1980) about Dr.’s plan. Khaled Al-Mubarak, Director of the Institute of Music and Theater at that time, decided to form a (national) orchestra in which musicians would play instruments from various regions of the country. In my article entitled (Avoiding Crusades), I relied on the knowledge and experience of El-Mahi Ismail, director of the Arabic music department at Radio Cologne, to point out that these instruments belong, originally, to various cultural environments, and that, for this reason, they will necessarily need to be retuned, that is, to practically extract them from the heart of their cultural soil, in preparation for forcing them to perform (in harmony!) with each other, so the result will be, instead of intercourse. Cultures, a big set of zeros! I called for contemplation of the grave dangers this entails for the future of cross-cultural dialogue and the coexistence of nationalities, when it turns into a mere forced arrangement of symbols, signs, and forms that lack, first of all, a spirit. It saddened me to see this futile plan revived, after it had been buried in its infancy. While the calls for (unity in diversity), (diversity in unity), and (dialogue of cultural components) are processes, in their essence, and not mere procedures, the mechanical administrative concepts lose all their meaning when they end up, amidst (the clamor) and (the noise), being mere distorted monsters that subject the musical cultures of the South, East, West, and Southeast to the dictates of the tunes of the North and Center, and nothing becomes more than reproducing the crisis. The conflict between (the center) and (the margin), albeit in another context!

(9)

(9/1) Since the late seventies and early eighties of the last century, that is, with the beginnings of the serious beginnings of the inauguration of the religious state project, which completed its most important transformative steps with the coup of June 30, 1989 AD, many traditional sections within the broad (rationalist/tawhid) trend, including broad social groups and segments among the “jalabah” themselves, began to wake up, albeit slowly, to the enormity of the danger that has become the Islamization plan. Arabization is threatened not only by the beliefs, languages, and cultures of “others,” but also by the future of Islam itself in the country, in addition to the Arabic language and Arab culture, that is, the existence of the Arabized Muslim community itself. These sections began to question that old plan

A path leading to (national unity), after realizing its failure to crystallize a vision that would attract even the consensus of the Muslim Arabists themselves, leave behind (the others) who aroused doubts about its objectives, which made it seem, in some way, whether it wanted to or not, an additional asset that feeds, in the final outcome, the trend of superiority (authoritarianism/deconstructionism)! Then, among these sections, a noticeable (rational) movement began towards the marginalized (other), based on Jahir’s recognition that “our country is in dire need of dealing with the diversity of identities on the basis of coexistence and integration, not conflict” (Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, “The Diversity of Identities..”, previous source). This is at a time when the (authoritarians/deconstructionists) are still on their terms, not only by marginalizing, integrating, or even erasing this (other), but by redrawing the map of the country itself geographically and demographically, if necessary, so that it becomes suitable for their standards! There is no more accurate expression of their hurt than this map, which raises difficulties for their movement, than an old complaint by Al-Turabi in his saying: “.. It was (our) destiny (we) in Sudan to (be afflicted) with a complex, complexly built country that almost represents all the African peoples with their languages, features, races, and customs” (Emphasis brackets from us: M/Al-Sayyad, A/May, Beirut 5/6/1988). This is enough to reveal the underlying intention regarding the issue of (unity) even in the current (Naivasha) negotiations!

(9/2) As for what can be called the national democratic political (conscience) among the (rational/theistic) trend, which is represented, in our opinion, by the forces of the left in all its sections, and specifically the Communist Party as it is the most ancient of them intellectually, politically and organisationally, the manifestations of that arrogance constituted, from an early time, a deep shock for him, and the most grievous of these is injustice, considering every protest movement on the margins as either a rebellion movement in the south or a racist conspiracy. In the west, and in the Nuba Mountains in particular. It was hoped that he would become an (opposite) destroyer of the visions, policies, and programs of the (authoritarian/deconstructive) movement, not just an (opponent) objecting to them. There is no doubt that great intellectual and political efforts have been made in this direction during the past fifty years. For example:

A/ The anti-colonial front recognized in its statement dated 9/28/1954 AD the right to (internal rule), not only for the nationalities of the South, but also for all Sudanese nationalities (Mohamed Suleiman, 1971 - included in: Abdullah Ali Ibrahim, 2001). (Internal rule) is what later became referred to as (regional self-government), a radical solution, in the party’s opinion, from all political, social and economic aspects. Its application necessarily entails taking into account the opinion of those who oppose it among the specific national group. From this precise angle, there will be no choice but to put it to a referendum, that is, for a form of self-determination.

B/ This is what Abdul Khaleq Mahjoub also emphasized in early 1971 AD by stressing that regional autonomy, a comprehensive democratic solution, must lead to self-determination to resolve the conflict over the issue of unity once and for all (On the Program 1971, 2002). It is worth noting that this broadening of the vision was recently included, perhaps for the first time outside the party’s documents, among the options of the “Kampala Declaration” issued by the experts’ workshop on the future of constitutional arrangements in Sudan, which was organized between January 26 and 27, 2004 AD by the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies in cooperation with the Uganda Pan-African Movement, where considerable weight was placed in the opinions of these experts on “the necessity of stipulating in the transitional constitution and in subsequent constitutions the permanent right of all existing nationalities to Sudan has access to self-determination whenever it deems it necessary, as it is a fundamental right and a guarantee of the rights of marginalized peoples. They stressed that this is the democratic way to create a voluntary and just unity in Sudan. "Kampala Declaration"

A/ In his contribution referred to, towards the fifth conference of the party, and with regard to the national and tribal groupings, Abdel Khaleq intended to focus some programmatic guidelines, such as the necessity of “actually encouraging the free growth of the cultures of these groups,” stressing that this would not happen “unless the languages and dialects of these groups are resurrected, and the democratic national state seriously intends to refine these tools and use them in education (according to educational experiences in this field) and in a comprehensive cultural renaissance.” “These cultures become part of the organic components of Sudanese culture” (about the program 1971, 2002). However, Abdel Khaleq did not suspend these directives in a vacuum, but rather attempted to situate them dialectically within a set of economic, social and political conditions without which they would not exist, and they revolve primarily around comprehensive democracy: democracy in the relations of production, in the political rights of the toiling masses, and in the political system (same source).

Dr. Hassan Al-Tahir Zarrouk, representative of the anti-colonial front in the first parliament 1954-1957, had demanded that “we should not teach the Arabic language or the Islamic religion in the south because they are foreign to the people of the south” (Muhammad Suleiman, 1971 - within Abdullah Ali Ibrahim, 2001). In order to avoid misunderstandings related to teaching Arabic and Islam, the communists have always felt a special sensitivity towards the calls for Islamization and Arabization existing in the forced integration curricula, that is, breaking (the other) in preparation for reformulating it within the Arab-Muslim context. The idea of ​​gradualism, voluntary consent, and mutual cultural acceptance, or what is known in short as (natural acculturation), has remained their concern since that early time. As for the proper understanding of the party’s position on religion, Hassan Al-Tahir’s demand must be read in conjunction, at least, with the criticism that he himself had previously made of the Soviet experience, about half a century before its collapse, when he alluded to its basic flaw in terms of “lack of appreciation of the role of religion in the lives of peoples” (New Sudan, September 1, 1944 - included in: Muhammad Nouri Al-Amin, doctoral dissertation - and see also our article: “The Soaking Matter,” Al-Sahafa). 1/2/2001).

E/ It was mentioned in the report of the committee investigating the disturbances that occurred in southern Sudan in August 1955 that the anti-colonial front, as part of its political activity in December 1954 in the Zande and Moro center and among cotton industry workers and their unions, distributed its leaflets in the Zande language (Committee Report, Khartoum 1956 - Yusuf Al-Khalifa Abu Bakr in Hariz and Herman Bell, 1965 - Dhamn Abdullah Ali Ibrahim, 2001).

And / Joseph Garang, a member of the Central Committee and Minister of State in the Ministry of Southern Affairs in the first May government, returned to prepare, based on the party’s program towards the issue of the South, the statement of June 9, 1969, which was based on the straight recognition of the objective facts of the issue that exist primarily in the historical and cultural differences between the North and the South, and the recognition, therefore, that our people in the South have the right to build and develop their cultures and traditions within the framework of a unified socialist Sudan (text of the statement under Muhammad Omar Bashir, 1970). In the context of implementing that program, Joseph Garang asked his technical advisor for training and education to study the possibility of adopting one of the southern languages, such as Dinka, which is the most widely spoken southern language, to be the region’s national language, and to determine the factors worth considering for that purpose, and to extrapolate the social, political, and economic consequences that will result from that in the country and in the region, and the expected reaction from southerners who speak other languages, and to also study the possibility of choosing more than one language for this purpose (Abdullah Ali Ibrahim, 2001). If that plan had been successfully implemented since then, it would have constituted a suitable model to be followed in the Nuba Mountains and in other than the Nuba Mountains.

(9/3) However, all that payment remained, unfortunately, trapped in the glorious slogan that might arouse some admiration, or perhaps lull the imagination somewhat. You can do this and more under the slogan (regional autonomy) or (the right of nationalities to develop and prosper). However, limiting it to it alone would turn it into a mere symbol that is intended to be accomplished by itself, a mere (amulet), (talisman), or (ruqyah)! This is what has continued to happen, unfortunately, with all those intellectual theses and programmatic signals that have stagnated, or nearly frozen, in the confines of general preambles, without being transformed, as they should be, even among experts and specialists from the communists and national democratic elements, into a useful revolutionary Sudanese science that they develop through review, enrich it in addition, increase their ability to interrogate its detailed facts, and plead with it to change the structure of social consciousness through the debate of daily toil among masses of different kinds. Nationalities and ethnic formations, that is, the masses that cannot be approached at any level to revolutionize their conditions without an active demand for better knowledge of these conditions. The (difficulty) of this knowledge would tempt us to retreat even from the level of brilliant insight that revolutionary thought had reached in previous periods. For example, and compared to that early enlightenment that prompted the Communist Party in 1954 to translate its political publications into the Zande language before distributing them in the centers for speaking the language, the secondary Arabization campaign in 1965, led by the Democratic Movement among teachers, did not care about placing local languages in the school curricula, which communist researchers considered an attack on the powers of other languages that may have served as a medium for education, or as a study subject for their speakers in preparation for becoming that medium, and the National Congress For Education (August 1969) Regarding the language of education in the South, nothing more than a recommendation was issued to use local languages in Arabic letters as the medium of instruction in the first two years in schools in rural areas, with Arabic taking its place starting from the third year (Abdullah Ali Ibrahim, 2001). Thus, we see that the prevailing “easelessness” in social consciousness, resulting from the “difficulty” of knowing (the other), can take effect even in revolutionary thought if it is not confronted with the necessary amount of vigilance and attention!

(10)

(1/10) In a press interview published shortly before his death, the editor of Africa News asked the late Youssef Kawa a question about what it was observed that he (repeats) in his conversations (continuously) about (a feeling) that he says he had in the past that he was (an Arab)! The deceased replied that, indeed, he had felt, until recently, that he was an “Arab” simply because he was a “Muslim,” but that feeling changed in the circumstances of his encounter over the course of his life with bitter experiences, at least two of which occurred while he was still a student in primary school, and “.. I was a strong believer at the time, closer to Islamic fundamentalism... and I was achieving high grades in the subject (Islamic Education). However, the teacher told us one day a story that turned my being upside down. The topic was as I remember. About (the torment of the grave), the teacher was explaining to us what awaits us after death, and he said: If you are a Muslim, an angel with bright skin will take you to heaven, but if you are an unbeliever, a black slave angel will take you to hell! I was amazed at the existence of a slave angel! Then I was equally surprised at the association of his slavery with his black color. These questions confused me, but I did not speak to anyone about them Also, the topic was about (Women and their Rights)... Suddenly the teacher said with resentment: Only Nuba women work as servants in the homes of the city! I felt an earth-shattering humiliation and began reviewing my political beliefs and convictions, and the change became clear in my behavior, and I began writing poetry about the justice and destiny of black people, as I said in a poem entitled (A Complaint to God):

Slaves...slaves, because we are black,

Are we destined to have masters simply because we are black?!

Then, may God have mercy on him, he told him how such incidents accumulated in his life with their negative effects, which ultimately led him to the forest, until he became Colonel Dr.’s deputy. John Garang in the leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation Army in the Nuba Mountains region. Interview by Stephen Amin; Africa News, Issue 61 - April 2001).

(10/2) Of course, it is not correct, as a general rule, to rely on this type of personal experiences alone in reconstructing the overall historical scene, nor do we think we are in need of any of that now, since we have fulfilled it, in our opinion, through the previous parts. This is on the one hand, but on the other hand, such statements issued by a distinguished leader of the stature of the late Youssef Kawa can only be taken as a projection of his early painful experiences as a human being, which were, and must be, lurking at the bottom of the background of his general activity as a political and military person, without giving them, in any case, a greater weight than their size in the context of the factors that make up his personality as a fighter. However, despite all this, we should not ignore the fact that this specific case goes beyond the specificity of its individuality to reveal the “abstract general” that is a recurring feature in its phenomenon, as well as the “concrete general” that embodies the law or order of connections in it, which constitutes a cross-section of its sometimes leaks, among all its similarities and counterparts, between the “unconscious” and “consciousness” in the overall typical model of protests. (The Margin) in its usual manifestations, especially in the South and the West, which the ideology of authoritarian supremacy has taken to calling (rebellion movements) or (racist movements). Perhaps very close to that was what we previously reported, quoting Anthony Morland, an AFP correspondent, regarding the explanation of Simon Callow, the movement’s director of education in the Nuba Mountains, of the backgrounds of their decision in 2001 to replace Arabic with English as the language of communication and instruction in forest schools, in which he not only stated that the old educational system was aiming to Arabize and Islamize the Nuba, but he was keen to add to that his saying: “I myself converted to Islam when I was a student and changed My name is Ismail, otherwise I would not have completed my education!

(10/3) Therefore, we may be on the verge of a more appropriate approach to approaching the second part of our question with which we began this writing, which is the part related to the extent of the responsibility of (the other) for the current condition of the issue of (national unity), in terms of the lack of separation in this responsibility between the (subject) of the struggle as a set of relationships, connections, and laws, and the (subject) of the struggler as an energy of social activity in which the availability of objective perception is coupled with the ability to produce an effective impact. Since the question, in fact, revolves around “a national question under backward conditions” (Joseph Garang, 1970), our use of the concept of “the other” does not come here in terms of “every individual” in the national or tribal structure of the “margin.” Rather, it focuses on the personality of the “intellectual/leader” in this structure, from the standpoint of the position he occupies in its midst, in such conditions of backwardness, and the role he plays. Hence, in terms of its exceptional and dangerous impact in terms of explaining the problem and crystallizing its final outcomes in general social consciousness, and not, of course, as a nihilistic denial of the effectiveness of the masses of this combination, as might come to mind. Indeed, this (intellectual/leader) is not able to exert this influence except through his conscious and intentional use of the systems of positive or negative values ​​and concepts that are formed at the level of the superstructure of the material activity of these same masses in the various aspects of their lives. So, the role of the marginal intellectual is determined, in reality, according to his specific, biased selection of these or those values ​​that he works on from within the structure of the local culture itself, essentially, and not from outside it, and he works to reproduce them in the new circumstances, and invests them in supporting the strategy that he promotes and mobilizes these masses around. Thus, it is completely appropriate to hold the Popular Movement accountable for its final vision of the issue of unity from the perspective of the political thought it adopts, without neglecting the set of visions and feelings that rage in the minds and consciences of its leaders and symbols, military and civilian, determining their choices, shaping their directions, and necessarily reflecting on the dynamics of the institutions through which they invoke the realization of their programs and projects.

(11)

(11/1) We begin by testing a main hypothesis, which is that, despite the fact that a lot of water has flowed under the political bridges in Sudan and its regional and global surroundings since 1983, the ideological concept (of the New Sudan), as the backbone of the program of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, which allowed it to be implemented on the ground in its current areas of influence in the Nuba Mountains, is still rooted in the core of the (Manifesto), which established its legitimacy at its first launch on that date. Perhaps the most prominent, and even the most brilliant, thing that was noticed in that document was the high position that the issue of “unity” occupied in it, even though it was overshadowed with disturbing clarity by its apparent tendency to reduce the entire issue to a purely idealistic and simplistic scheme that excludes all claims of diversity and pluralism, and attributes it entirely to a colonial “divide and rule” conspiracy! Despite this, the movement and its thesis about “unity” were received with widespread popular optimism, and deserved in its essence, which contributed to the Marxist left and the revolutionary democratic movement in fueling its enthusiasm. It is not surprising, since it was not an easy matter for the emergence of a southern political movement that was hostile to Numeiri’s dictatorship, at that time, and that, at the same time, transcends the narrowness and limitations of the traditional regional outlook, to place the issue of (unity) at the top of its priorities, while aiming to bring about profound transformations at the level of all of Sudan (through development), (equality), (justice), and (socialism). Perhaps this is precisely what, in addition to the never-ending desire that the dialogue with her lead to further revolutionizing her thesis, is what explains the optimism and leftist and democratic revolutionary enthusiasm with which she was received!

(11/2) There has already been a tremendous development in the political performance of the movement, which, in general, has gained extensive experience during the past two decades, completed its main structures at various levels, withstood the splits that targeted it to weaken, succeeded in building bridges with various forces, strengthened its alliances at both the internal and external levels, and has become, in general, a number that is difficult to overcome on the map of Sudanese politics. But, on the other hand, it misjudged on more than one occasion, deviated from the truth in more than one position, and committed great mistakes, in general, which inflicted heavy losses on the country’s political development process. It is not far from mind, at least, Al-Sadad’s paradoxical reading, by all standards, of the events of the popular uprising in April 1985 and the political change that resulted from it. The movement did not take place except as an extension of May, or (May Two, as in the term I used. Its leader, Colonel Dr. John Garang, described the Transitional Military Council, which was formed at that time to resolve the issue of power after the collapse of the Numeiri regime, by saying: “The Military Council is nothing but the May regime, only of Other than Al-Numeiri” (Dr. Mansour Khaled; A Story of Two Countries, p. 382), in addition to the frustration caused, in the context of this misreading, by his speech, which was broadcast at that time on the movement’s radio from Ethiopia for days on end, in which it said: “The issue is not fifteen generals holding the reins of power in Khartoum, and no one should think that he is the one who takes and he is the giver, for God is the giver and he is the taker.” taketh” Al-Haraka Radio, 5/26/1985), and other things that are known to everyone far and near.

(11/3) However, what concerns us here in particular is the movement’s transformation from the old thesis of the “Manifesto” on the issue of “unity” to a practical political performance that continued to present the concept of “New Sudan,” but with a different content. It seemed, at first glance, as if, by extending a hand towards other national “marginal” formations, it had moved towards a better presentation of this issue, in recognition of the issue of “diversity in unity,” and in keeping with all the rights of these formations, most important of which is their inherent right to Expressing its identity distinction and the flourishing of its own cultures. To what extent is this understanding of the content of the new position correct, especially in light of the formulation and implementation of the movement’s new linguistic policy, or what its intellectual/leader Simon Kalu calls (the linguistic revolution!) in the areas under its administration in the Nuba Mountains?!

Continue