Is the path of peace alone or separation?

Continue the path of peace alone or separation

Introduction to marginalized areas agreements

This was a necessary introduction, and this time I will discuss the details of the agreements, focusing with the reader on two incidents that were circulated as messages via mobile phone. The first was immediately after the celebration of the agreements, and the other was after the Nairobi Declaration, because of its connotation, popular spontaneity, far from the maneuvers of politics and politicians, over the agreements, and because it spread at all levels to be circulated among the people of Sudan in their homeland and among their immigrants.

The first joke says, “Marrying a southern woman guarantees your right to wealth, power, and the three regions.” This joke is an embodiment of the depth of the Sudanese problem, and an accurate expression of what the agreements face. We will address it based on two hypotheses. The first is that its source is northern. In this case, and assuming good intentions and that it is just a joke, it can be viewed as a necessity for serious work towards brotherhood and intermarriage, despite the condition stated in it that places it in the category of frustration and despair due to the characteristic of the Northern’s condescension over the Southern and Southern women. In its form, it constitutes a direct criticism of all the peace agreements (sharing wealth, power, security arrangements, and the three regions), as it can be viewed. The opinion of the Sudanese street about these agreements is that the movement has obtained everything, and in order to obtain a few rights, everyone must lean towards the movement. In my opinion, this is a harsh criticism from the street of the other party to the agreement. However, if its source is from the South, it can be viewed as saying, O people of the North, if you want us to coexist in Sudan with justice and unity, you must abandon your arrogance and extend your hand to us with friendliness, love, and mixing without race or religion. Only then will the mind be calm and the crooked will be straightened. It is also not devoid of superiority and clearly reflects the ecstasy of the victor. In both cases, this joke highlights the essence of the contradictions and gives the indicator required to cross from the darkness of division and fighting to the light of unity and brotherhood.

As for the second, which I received after the Nairobi Declaration and in multiple forms, its conclusion is: “Colonel John Garang cabled Lieutenant General Al-Bashir that he had 80 young Muslims who would like to marry Jaal’s daughters. Al-Bashir replied to him: Brother John Garang, please direct your request to those who signed the agreement with you.” This joke is also more severe than the first in embodying the Sudanese problem. I followed the reactions of some Sudanese and, unfortunately, I did not find anything that stopped it or gave it more dimension than a common joke. In fact, it can be understood based on the reservations proposed to the agreements from the leadership summit of the National Conference, for example, Dr. Ghazi Salah El-Din, and Dr. Qutbi Al-Mahdi, and Dr. Amin Hassan Omar, that these agreements are not binding except on those who signed them, and if this trend is the one referred to, then it is hoped and in the interest of the unity of the nation’s territory that it must be avoided. However, in my opinion, the matter goes beyond that to a more accurate diagnosis and clarification of the reality and nature of the problem, which is tribal and regional supremacy between the North and the North and between the North and the South. This is the matter that requires social efforts, if well-intentioned, to build bridges of trust between all the tribes of Sudan, whether southern or northern, western or eastern. Either Sudan is a united, fused race, or it is dismembered. It is also noted in this joke that it excluded the religious dimension of the problem, but it highlighted the role of tribal racism. Have our politicians been able to realize the dimension of our problem to the extent that our street has realized in some of these parties that we have referred to?

I will begin my talk about the two agreements in the three regions because of their personal importance to me, as I am one of the people of these regions, and because of their importance that overshadows the rest of the agreements. The importance of these two agreements lies in the choice of separation.

Area agreements (South Kordofan/South Blue Nile and Abyei) The two zone agreements

Before discussing these two agreements, I see the need to alert the honorable reader to be aware of previous agreements that paved the way for these two agreements, specifically the Shaqdum Agreement between the Umma Party and the Popular Movement, the fateful decisions signed by the Asmara Rally, and the Fashoda Agreement between the government and the D faction. Lam Akol, the Peace Villages Agreement, and the Agreement to Cease Fighting in the Nuba Mountains, and because of their implications for these two agreements, and I will limit myself to focusing on the Nuba Mountains and Abyei regions.

Regarding this topic, I must mention what we previously called for ten years ago - we, the people of the seam areas at the time and the marginalized ones now, my weak person and a large number of the people of these areas, especially the engineer Ibrahim Madibo and others - as we addressed the problem of these areas because they are a model of positive ethnic mixing and an example of effective and effective peaceful coexistence, highlighting their important role and historical legacy in preserving the unity of Sudan. Yes, we wrote one memorandum after another and we had our vision for all the leaders of the political forces and the popular movement, especially Colonel John Garang, Commander (may God have mercy on him) Yusuf Koh, the National Rally, Mr. Sadiq Al Mahdi, and Mr. Muhammad Othman Al-Marghani.

Yes, we addressed all of them, warning of the danger of treating and dealing with the issues of the national contact areas away from the people of the contact, considering that they are more familiar with their customs, traditions, and morals. At that time, we also did not miss reminding of the importance of the regional contact, alerting to the tribal extensions in our northwestern borders with Libya, Chad, with Central Africa, with the Congo, with Ethiopia, and with Eritrea.

Unfortunately, all these efforts and memorandums did not find a listening ear. For these and many other reasons, it is noted that the two agreements violated international norms and returned the wheel of history to the borders before independence and the formation of Sudan with its current map. They completely bypassed what was agreed upon in the Machakosh Protocol, which is an extremely dangerous matter, especially if the unity decision is not reached, and in this case the door will be wide open for many areas of national and regional contact to achieve the same goal.

A- The Abyei Agreement

We summarize below the essential points of this agreement:

* The agreement defined the Abyei area as the borders of the Amoudiyyat or the nine sheikhdoms of the Nok Dinka, which were annexed to Kordofan in the year 1905, and reserved for the Misseriya and other pastoral tribes their traditional right to graze cows and move within its borders (Abyei Area).

* The agreement obligates the Presidency of the State, which is responsible for the administration of this region, to form a committee to demarcate the borders of this region in accordance with what was agreed upon, provided that this committee is formed and completes its work within the first two years of the transition period.

* The referendum of the people of the Abyei area coincides with the general referendum at the end of the transitional period on self-determination of  South Sudan and is limited to two things:

1- Abyei maintains its special administrative status in the north

2- Or to follow Bahr el Ghazal.

* It was also agreed to distribute the revenue from the local petroleum product at a rate of 50% to the central government, 42% to the SPLM, 2% to Bahr el Ghazal State, 2% to West Kordofan State, 2% to the Nuk Dinka, and 2% to the Misseriya.

The above points are the essence of the agreement. I stopped at it because of the shadow it might cast on the rest of the agreements, noting that the other points of agreement focused on how to govern, manage and develop the region.

What is striking about this agreement is the specification of the Abyei Area, which is supposed to be precise and decisive, especially since the issue of the Abyei Area took up a large space in the negotiations and almost prevented reaching an agreement. However, it was summarized in two lines, far from being precisely specific. Even the reference to the borders of the nine columns was a loose phrase that could involve everyone in a new negotiation spiral, especially since it was linked to the administrative decision referred to in 1905 AD regarding the annexation of Kordofan, which is inaccurate as the annexation decision was taken in 1904 AD.

In my opinion, behind all of this is the mischievous purpose of opening the door to negotiations on the ground and in reality, in order to overcome the failure of the Naivasha negotiations, which may provide a greater opportunity to achieve the goal later. In order for the picture to be clear to the honorable reader, we must return to the sequence of events in this region during the years (1901-1905) to find out what was proven about it on maps and the agreements agreed upon about it.

* In 1901, the southern borders of the Kordofan District were drawn, noting that the Bahr al-Ghazal District was not annexed to Sudan until 1902 AD. These borders were redrawn after the annexation of the Bahr al-Ghazal District.

* In 1903 AD, these maps were amended to show the administrative borders separating the Kordofan Directorate and Bahr al-Ghazal, establishing the border between the two directorates to the Arabian Sea border (Mardon Maps).

* In 1904, after surveying the tribal borders, it was decided to follow Sultan Rob and Sheikh Rayhan, who lived in the region south of the Arabian Bahr, to the Kordofan Directorate. Accordingly, the borders were drawn, including the triangle designated by the coordinates [(28:40,9:25)–(28:00,9:20)–(27:45,9:35)]  approximately, which is located between the Arabian Sea in the north and the borders of Bahr al-Ghazal. South according to Captain Lloyd's map in 1904 (see map)

* In 1905, a fraternity pact was signed between Nazir Nimr Ali Al-Jallah and Sultan Kuala Arup, according to which the Ngok Dinka crossed the Arabian Sea towards the north and settled in the middle of the Misseriya in what is now known as the city of Abyei. In this sense, they are definitely outside the borders of the conflict.

From the above, it is clear that the administrative annexation according to the tribal borders of the border triangle subject to the dispute took place in 1904 and not in 1905, and what was done in 1905 was a fraternity pact between the Misseriya tribe and the Ngok Dinka tribe. If the agreement refers to these facts and constants, then the matter is settled and the borders referred to here are clear. We do not see a need for what was proven in the agreement regarding the formation of a committee to demarcate the borders. But if the reference is to new borders to be negotiated based on the Fraternity Pact concluded in 1905, then in this case I do not see that there is an agreement and that the entire issue will be under negotiation again. I sincerely hope that this is not the case and I sincerely hope that Abyei will not be an excuse for the secession of the South.

As for the two options on the basis of which it was agreed to hold the referendum, it is clear that the option of secession is the one in mind, as if the option of Abyei’s dependency on Bahr al-Ghazal was chosen, then there are no restrictions or conditions. However, if the option of Abyei’s dependency on the north was chosen, conditions and restrictions were imposed so that this region maintains a special status, which is its dependency on the presidency, instead of the choice of the people of the region to live in the region. If that is the case, then in my estimation, the entire issue has been postponed for a time in which it may be repeated in the future. The Abyei problem remains the straw that breaks the camel.

The third point is regarding the distribution of local produced revenues, which we accept, except that it linked this distribution to specific tribes (2%  for the Nok Dinka and 2% for the Misseriya tribe), and it was desirable to link it  to the areas of these two tribes due to the comprehensiveness and justice of the distribution. We also note that a confusion occurred in which this agreement was signed to allocate 2% to the state of West Kordofan at a time when part of the state of West Korfan was annexed to its south. Did he mean From that giving and taking at the same time, or because the negotiation process was for each separate issue and such a contradiction will be amended, and how will the amendment be? Will these percentages be generalized to all of the state of South Caravan or will they retain their specificity as they are in this agreement?

Dear reader, these are some of the observations that I saw as essential in the Abyei Area Agreement, and as proven in the documents, the triangle that is the subject of the agreement does not exceed an area of approximately 900 square kilometers, and its people have never faced a problem that was not dealt with with a measure of wisdom and understanding of everyone’s interests, out of respect for the traditions and customs they lived and made to be the law of life for the citizens of this region. So, can we return the matter to them, and just as they dealt with their issues in the past, I am certain that they are capable of handling them in the present, and let us all be Dinka sons. The Misseriya is an example of the unity of a country torn by war, and let us cherish the methods of brotherhood formulated by our grandfathers and fathers.

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