Is the path of peace alone or separation?

Continue the path of peace alone or separation

Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile Agreement

Before I discuss in detail the agreement (South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile) and focusing on the South Kordofan region, it is necessary to pause about what happened in the Sudanese arena during the past weeks because of its negative impact on the complexity of the Sudanese situation and the internationalization that violated its privacy.

The past weeks have witnessed all international and regional movements, at the very least assuming good faith, aimed at finding ways out of the tunnel of darkness into which Sudan has been pushed. The visit of the architect of global diplomacy, Colin Powell, came simultaneously with the sponsor of international rights, Kofi Annan, and with great humility witnessed by the world, and both of them went to the camps of our people in the west of the country to find out what was a deplorable situation, only to find people sleeping in the dirt and eating the scraps of the land, so they sat among them and lived their misery despite the great difference in the ways of life there, as there was a big difference between the corridors of the United Nations and the luxury of the American State Department. What they saw in western Sudan is something that prompts everyone with a living conscience to strive tirelessly to stop this tragedy and eradicate its causes. The orders came with a degree of clarity demanding that the government stop the Janjaweed, as if the whole problem was the Janjaweed, knowing that the Janjaweed phenomenon is nothing but a product of the weakness and chaos that affected this part of Sudan, which came later to explode the situation. What is required of us is a serious stance to address the causes of the war and stop its repercussions. The combatants must first stop all methods of killing, displacing and terrorizing citizens by staying away from the mechanisms of war and leaning toward negotiation. Here we find it our right to ask, for whose benefit are our people displaced and killed? For whose benefit do we make them a media commodity for which satellite channels and relief organizations compete? Why this intransigence in the positions of the government and the rebel movements if the intention is really to achieve the interests of the citizens of Darfur?

International officials have returned to their positions to place the Darfur problem on the tables of UN decision-making sites. Last week, the US Congress issued a resolution confirming that what is happening in western Sudan is genocide, a charge addressed in Chapter Seven in the Security Council. This decision certainly paved the way for the Security Council’s decision to give Sudan thirty days to solve the problem in its west.

News continues to spread about the movements of all Western countries, warning of the consequences of a lack of seriousness in reaching a solution to the Darfur problem. At the same time, the Organization of African States has taken a courageous decision to move an observation battalion to Darfur, and to host a meeting of the parties in Addis Ababa. I believe that they should be supported and supported because, in my estimation, this is a successful beginning that may provide the opportunity to sit down after ensuring the security of citizens to dissect the causes of the problem and reach sound and effective solutions to it. As for the League of Arab States, its move was timid, and it did not offer anything new other than meetings here or there. During the African movement, the Naivasha meetings began between the government and the movement, and the Ethiopia meeting between the government and the Darfur movements. This was followed by the assembly meeting in Asmara, which was preceded by a meeting of the friendly forces with the head of the SPLM, which was also preceded by a meeting of the head of the movement with the shuttles, sultans, and sheikhs of the three regions.

All of these meetings and movements, in my estimation, have clashed with the exclusivity of the Naivasha agreements and the requirements for solutions to the Darfur problem. The Naivasha meetings did not advance for anything other than the two parties to the agreement adhering to their forces, and this was also the case in the Addis Ababa meetings, and the meeting of the friendly forces with the head of the SPLM. As for the assembly meetings in Asmara, they were not better than others as announced, but the observer can, from readings of what was issued, conclude that the meeting of the assembly’s leadership body produced new convictions, and clear new concepts and signals emerged from it, namely:

* Replacing the principle of uprooting with dealing with assets.

* Increase the extent of the strategic partnership to include the National Conference.

* The assembly must negotiate with the government to obtain its share of governance.

The first point was confirmed very clearly in a speech by the movement’s official spokesman, Yasser Arman, when he stressed that the talk about uprooting has passed and the assembly must absorb the changes and developments. He later said, “The existence of a peace agreement will not eliminate the political forces that make up the assembly and other parties such as the Umma Party and the Popular Congress, nor will it eliminate important and just issues such as the Darfur issues. The Sudanese government and the Popular Movement are required to deal with these political forces,” except as evidence and clarification of how to deal with them. Both parties to the agreement with the rest of the political forces, including the Rally. As for what Colonel John Garang said about his non-objection to the bloc negotiating with the government and participating with it in the percentage it set at 52%, it is a clear confirmation that the percentage of movement in power and wealth does not belong to the partners in the bloc, and it came in a clear response to the bloc’s spokesman, Hatem Al-Sir, when he went to collect the numbers, pointing out that the bloc is heir to the percentage of movement, the political forces, the southern forces, etc.

As for talking about the Jeddah Framework Agreement and its revival, in my estimation, what happened in Jeddah was overtaken by what happened in Naivasha, because the Jeddah Framework Agreement had previously secured in advance everything that would take place in Naivasha, and the Naivasha Agreement was a bilateral agreement that was closed to both parties to the agreement, and in proportions and numbers that required amending any of them, not only the approval of the two parties to the agreement, but the approval of the sponsors of the agreement, and on top of that, the government had originally disavowed this agreement, with or without conditions.

As for talking about solving the Darfur problem and its support mechanisms, it is definitely dependent on the will of the signatories of the agreement (the Popular Movement and the National Congress), especially since the movement in Darfur has announced its agreement to stop the fighting and turn to negotiation. There will be no political solution to this problem unless the two parties to the Naivasha Agreement declare very clearly that they accept the principle of the other’s participation within the proportions they agreed upon, because the solution to the Darfur problem lies in full participation in governance. This means the necessity of amending the Naivasha Agreements to have a space that meets the aspirations and rights of the people of Darfur. And if intentions are good, let this declaration be comprehensive for the problem of eastern Sudan and their proportions included in this declaration. Only then must an all-inclusive conference be held for the people of Darfur, and I am certain that they will They are able to contain the problem.

These are the events that took place during the past weeks, and I decided to mention them at the beginning of this article to clarify the explosive picture that Sudan is experiencing. They are volcanoes. I ask God to guide us to the means of controlling them so that they do not explode and bomb Sudan’s unity and cohesion.

South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains Agreement

Before discussing this agreement, I see the need to clarify the administrative borders, geographical nature, and population distribution of this region in the hope of linking the terms of the agreement to the reality of this region. According to the administrative borders of 1956, this district covers central-western Sudan, bordered by the White Nile District to the northeast, North Karfan District to the north, North Darfur District to the northwest, South Darfur to the southwest, and Bahr al-Ghazal District to the south.  The total area of ​​the South Kordofan region is about 120,000 square kilometers. The area that was known as the Misseriya countryside represents approximately 50%, and the Dilling, Kadugli, and Heiban countryside represents 50%. The total area of ​​mountains in the region is about 5,000 square kilometers, that is, 4% of the region’s area. Its borders meander from the southwest of Tandelti, parallel to the railway line, passing through Abu Zabd, then southwest of Al-Adiya, and north of Al-Fula, until Babanusa, and continues until the south of the city of Abyei, and meanders with the Arabian Sea near Al-Mallam, north of Al-Qardud, Tonga, and Kaka. This area contains the mountains of: Al-Karku, Kasha, Al-Shafar, Dhalman, Al-Mandel, Dilling, Abu Januq, Tabq, Kujuriya, Abu-Damaa, Al-Dago, Talshi, Tema, Al-Kamda, Katla, Al-Namnaq, Wali, Dumik, Meri, Kiqa, Al-Kawalib, Moro Range, Atoro, Tira, and the Takali Mountains. This is the region of South Kordofan, with its foothills, valleys, and green hills, with its abundant cisterns and resources, and with its varied fertile soil, from sandy and clayey in the north and northwest to dark clay in the south of the region. This region, despite its stock of natural resources, God has not guided our successive national governments since the country’s independence to even think about investing these resources. The word development was not found in the dictionary of this region, as the first and last development project in this region was during the British rule, which was the rain-fed cotton cultivation project in the Liqawa area, and the development it was based on was represented by the Liqawa cotton gin, which grew old and died after independence. The people of this region are divided into Nuba tribes according to the names of the mountains, tribes that have their own customs and traditions, and have their own language in which they deal with other tribes, whether Nuba or Arab. As for the valleys, Al-Battah, and Al-Qizan, other main tribes live, including: the Misseriya tribe in the western part, the Hawazma tribe in the central part, and the Taqali, and the allies and Ould Ihmid in the eastern part, and many other tribes are spread in this region, such as Kenana, Al-Kawahla, Al-Badiriya, Al-Qamar, Al-Barti, Al-Falata, Al-Barqo, etc. The only two sources of income in this region are grazing cows and sheep and agriculture, and the two methods have no economic return other than a means of survival. As for the state, it is a source of taxes and a source of income for the state treasury, and every year the situation of the people of this region has become as if they are wage earners for their money and agricultural workers for the central government without guarantees and workers’ rights.

This is the condition of the people of this region, and although it is one of the richest regions of Sudan in terms of its wealth and the fertility of its land, its people are still suffering in incredible backwardness, ignorance, disease, and lack of the most basic necessities of life. It is an area no less than the lowest countryside in the West or a state, with the big difference between this and that. Let us see what the Naivasha Agreement stated about this region.

The most important points of agreement

A- Regarding the borders and the mechanism for taking the opinions of the citizens of the region, it was agreed on:

* Returning to the borders of the old state of South Kordofan, when the Karfan region was divided into two parts, north and south.

* Taking the opinion of the people of South Kordofan State about the agreement is a democratic method to accommodate the observations of the people of the state in the agreement. The agreement is subject to the will of the people of the state through their democratically elected legislators.

* State legislators must form a parliamentary committee to review and evaluate the agreement, as well as follow up and evaluate its implementation. The Presidency of the Republic must form an independent committee to follow up on its implementation.

* The agreement is the final solution to the political problem in the state after the people of the state acknowledge through their legislative apparatus that it meets their aspirations.

* If the state’s legislative body notices some deficiencies, it must negotiate with the central government with the aim of correcting these deficiencies  in a way that does not conflict with the general framework of the agreement.

B- About wealth and power

* The oil-producing state is entitled to 2% of the oil produced therefrom.

* Since the main goal of the National Reconstruction and Development Fund is to develop the regions affected by war and the less developed regions, the two parties to the agreement agreed to allocate 75% of the total allocated portion of the fund to the regions affected by the war, especially South Kordofan and the Blue Nile.

* In the period before the elections, it was agreed that the state’s legislative council would be composed of 55% of the government and 45% of the movement. The position of governor of the state will alternate between the government and the movement, with it linked to the governor of Blue Nile State, so that the governors of the two regions are not from one party at the same time.

The above points are the essence of the agreement on the issue of the Nuba Mountains. The region was restored to its previous state when Sudan had nine directorates, including the Kordofan Directorate, which consists of North and South Kordofan. At that time, South Kordofan consisted of the Misseriya Rural Council in Fara’a al-Thalatha, the Dilling Council, the Eastern Mountains Council, and the Kadugli Council. This, in my estimation, would be positive if combined with the rest of the provisions supporting development. However, we must be aware of the repercussions of this amendment in the state borders. For example, what is the fate of the remaining part of West Kordofan State? Will it return to the North Kordofan region or will it create new states? Moreover, the damage resulting from this agreement to the new region and the old state was not taken into account, which may require special treatment before the final agreement, in addition to the strange situation created by the Abyei Agreement. Will the southern region of the current state of West Kordofan, which was assigned a special status in this aforementioned agreement, be part of the South Kordofan region? What is the fate of its allocations in the Abyei Agreement? It is also noted that the people of the region have the right to add what they deem may lead to improving their situation through the agreement, and that the agreement is considered final after the people of the region approve of it. This is a compliment to this agreement that was not included in the rest of the agreements. However, he linked this right to adherence to the general framework of the Naivasha agreements. In my estimation, this means that these amendments do not affect the borders of the region, for example, or change the proportions of government in it or the position of the army in it.

The dangerous thing about this agreement is what was mentioned later in talking about the authority, as it linked all the legislative and parliamentary institutions in the region during the period before the elections to appointing their members by both parties to the agreement: the government 55% and the movement 45%, that is, the principles and rights that were approved for the citizen of the region at the beginning of the agreement were withdrawn from all the people of the region and returned to the members of both parties to the agreement. This means that the government and the movement are the decision-making party, and as we will see in the next article, God willing. God, the aforementioned general elections do not have a specific date, as it was indicated that they should take place at the end of the first three years of the transitional period as a minimum and are subject to the assessment of both parties to the agreement, which casts shadows on the date of their occurrence. Accordingly, the rule of the region during the greater part of the transitional period, which extends for more than six years, will be by the National Congress and the Popular Movement (the Nuba Mountains faction), which will certainly increase the marginalization of the people of the region not only in expressing their opinion on what was agreed upon, but also in how to govern during this delicate and important period in the stability of Sudan and the region. If we follow the conferences held by the movement (the Nuba Mountains faction) in the mountain region during the past months (the Kauda Conference, the Tema Conference, and the conferences that followed them in Canada and Washington), we notice, unfortunately, an exclusionary spirit that excludes all the people of the region except the Nuba tribes. Rather, these conferences went into the details of how to govern this region in the same way, forgetting the social fabric and customs in this region that linked all the tribes of the people of this region to each other, which calls us To say that unless this exclusionary concept is modified from one of the pillars of the rule of the coming region, the region will definitely not enjoy security and stability because the people of this region will not leave it in implementation of a decision and will not submit to an arrogant tyranny.

A final issue that must be taken into consideration is that the division of wealth for this region was not stated in the agreement with the same clarity, as it was established the general right to 2% of oil production and it was included in preference only for the amounts allocated to the areas affected by the war. In addition, there is a conflict and lack of clarity, as we mentioned, in linking the Abyei Agreement and this agreement in the part related to the 2% allocated to the Misseriya and 2% allocated to the Dinka, especially if the people of the region agreed to join South Kordofan, as well as The 2% rate for West Kordofan. Will all these percentages be allocated to be 8% of the product, or at least 6%, or will the region lose all these entitlements and be satisfied with only the 2% fixed in this agreement?

The bottom line is that Sudan is going through a dangerous turning point, and its problems have become the focus of attention of the entire world and at the top of its news list.  Certainly, no single party or party among the people of Sudan is able to confront what they are facing, nor be able to find solutions to them. The matter requires a degree of detachment and self-denial by involving all the people of Sudan to participate in finding solutions that will lead the country to safety. What is required of both parties to the Naivasha Agreements is to extend their hands unconditionally to all other political forces, civil society institutions, and the people of Sudan’s regions, so that everyone speaks out in support of Sudan. They are required to speak loudly in their speech and actions so that every loyal patriot is reassured to participate and contribute to getting the country out of this dark tunnel. Otherwise, I fear what will come from the Security Council’s resolutions and their consequences in Chapter Seven of the Charter.

To our good people in South Kordofan, I say that you must overcome the bitterness of the past. Enough of the war, fighting and division. All the people of the region, Arabs and Nuba, are victims of exploitation. All the people of the region must return to it, as it needs the hands of men for construction and development so that the blood of its people can be a seed of prosperity and a beacon for generations.

These are the summaries of the observations on the agreement on the Nuba Mountains problem, and we will continue the discussion about the agreements on wealth and power.

Continue: Will peace truly prevail throughout Sudan?