Implementing the policy of the United States of America in Sudan
Testimony of John Prendergast
International Emergency Group, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa
Hearing: July 11, 2002
The answer to all questions: a just and comprehensive peace
The missing link in the peace process: the power of influence
Building influence through the peace process itself
Bigger carrots and sticks to support the peace process
B- Incentives for the government
C- Pressure on the Sudan People's Liberation Army
D- Incentives for the Sudan People's Liberation Army
During the past two decades of Sudan's civil war, there have been few hopeful moments and definite windows of opportunity for peacemaking. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, one of those opportunities has arrived, and the window of possibility for peace has opened. For a number of reasons, however, the window is closing quickly. If serious pressure is not immediately exerted on the two warring parties regarding the content of the peace negotiations currently underway in Kenya, the window will close, condemning the Sudanese to cumulative levels of death and destruction that few wars since World War II have paralleled.
The answer to all questions: a just and comprehensive peace
The United States has a number of basic policy objectives in Sudan: fighting terrorism, advancing human rights and democracy, ending the war, and supporting humanitarian aid. All of these goals can be addressed through a comprehensive peace agreement that reforms the central government and at the same time provides the exercise of self-determination for the South Sudanese.
More than any country in the world, the United States of America has the ability to move the Sudanese peace process forward. The United States decided to emphasize making the peace process in Kenya a serious process. So far, US efforts are helpful but by no means sufficient. Hence the appropriate timing for this hearing held today.
In the topsy-turvy debate over policy toward Sudan, the very idea of a negotiated settlement has come under fire from those who believe that negotiations with Khartoum are ineffective. This may prove true, but in the absence of a new goal for American policy that has not yet been formed, this view leaves the Sudanese people, especially the southerners, in a state of war without end. In fact, the southerners are prepared to continue the war indefinitely in the event that a just peace is not reached, and this element is still neglected by the mediators. However, as long as there is an opportunity to end the conflict by reaching a comprehensive peace agreement, we must immediately and diligently strive to achieve that goal.
For clarity, we say that in order for there to be a chance for peace efforts to succeed, the goal of the negotiations must emphasize a just settlement. There are indications from the ongoing talks in Kenpa that mediators and observers are backing away from supporting self-determination through a referendum based on all possible options, including independence. It cannot be stressed enough that the South Sudanese will continue the war, regardless of its cost or manifestations, if this radical political element is not part of the agreement in some way. Constraints can be discussed, of course, but the necessary principle seems vulnerable to assault, and this guarantees the failure of the negotiations. It is not too late to fix the situation.
The missing link in the peace process: the power of influence
Due to the divergent positions of the two parties, it is unlikely to bring them closer together through traditional facilities alone. This requires stronger diplomatic intervention - of which leverage is a key element - than we are seeing now. Therefore, the most obvious missing link to the success of IGAD's peaceful efforts is the coordination between pressures and incentives.
The power of influence does not grow on trees. It creates by leading the development of a multi-pronged strategy from carrot to stick, and executing it wisely. Despite the influence the United States has over the warring parties, American diplomats have previously claimed that they lack the influence to move the two sides toward peace. Such allegations increase the Sudanese parties’ convictions of the lack of desire to use US influence during negotiations - convictions that in fact reduce the role of external influence in the form of self-convincing prophecy.
Pressures and incentives must be multifaceted to be effective. As long as it is the most influential actor and the only one who all Sudanese parties believe can make peace, the United States must take the lead in organizing the most reasonable and most tactically appropriate application of these carrots and sticks. This may be the single most important contribution the United States can make. Influence can be increased through steps and positions in the content of the peace process, and through more broad policies pursued by the United States. These two elements are discussed below. All of this requires the leadership of the United States of America, but its impact will be greater if it is done through the United Kingdom, the European Union and other parties - with our European allies as well as other influential countries.
Building influence through the peace process itself
The peace process itself provides a number of opportunities for the United States to increase its influence over the parties in order to support peace:
1- Supporting self-determination: United States support for the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan - through a referendum with a comprehensive horizon for all possible possibilities - provides the most important point for exercising influence on the two parties to push them towards a just settlement. In the event that the United States does not support this position, the SPLA will either withdraw from the talks or, in the best case, will reach meaningful bargains on other issues, and the Khartoum government will have no incentives to bargain similarly, as long as it gets what it wants without giving up everything. On the other hand, US support for self-determination will force the SPLA to compromise on other issues, while the most important internal pressure will force Khartoum to commit to implementing any agreement it may conclude with the opposition in order to create the strongest position to maintain a united Sudan. At the present time, mixed signals from the United States and others may indicate a decline below the level of influence, and it is clear that the mediators are underestimating the depth of South Sudanese feeling in support of a contested independence.
2- Including the northern opposition: An agreement cannot be truly comprehensive if it does not include or find acceptance by the Sudanese parties that represent the entire Sudanese electorate. The northern opposition parties under the banner of the National Democratic Rally, as well as the Umma Party, must be involved more directly in the IGAD process. Their involvement will have an impact on avoiding extremism by both the Khartoum government and the SPLA, and will better position all representatives to support the implementation of any agreement. So far, neither the United States nor the Ibaqad countries have prioritized expanding the peace process.
3- The strategy with IGAD’s neighbors: At a time when the United States was coordinating its policy towards Sudan with Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda, a new influence was generated that resulted in Khartoum accepting the IGAD Declaration of Principles. Now that the Ethiopian-Eritrean war has ended, it is time again to make a significant effort to rebuild and focus the partnership to reach a negotiated solution to the Sudanese conflict. This requires more focused and sustained American diplomacy at a higher level than is currently underway.
4- Strategy with Egypt: It is understood that the emphasis on American policy towards Egypt focuses on the Egyptian position opposing any discussion of the issue of self-determination for the south, which is a harmful position that limits Egypt’s role in any peace process. More difficult to understand, however, is the untapped influence that Egypt can exercise, in particular, over Khartoum. Egypt has an acquired right to a reformed Sudanese state, with a moderate government. If Egypt is strongly and persistently attracted by the United States at a high level, it can become an inevitable partner in developing and providing the kind of serious concessions that ensure that the Khartoum government creates the unity that the South Sudanese desire. The United States should also engage in serious discussion with Egypt, again at a high level, about the status of self-determination.
5- Strategy with the European Union: The United States must work at high levels to convince the European Union that the normalization of its relations with Khartoum must become a deal that is contingent only on the approval of a permanent peace agreement, instead of it being contingent on the achievement of scattered, short-term indicators in the field of humanitarian aid and human rights, as is currently the case. Senator Danforth's upcoming visit to Europe could be an opportunity to stimulate greater efforts in this direction.
6- Annexing the Pentagon: The influence of the United States on both parties will improve according to the degree to which the US Department of Defense supports the process in a tangible way. It is known that one of the most effective elements in the US effort to stop the Ethiopian-Eritrean war was to include military officers in the US negotiating team, and to allow the team to travel on a US Air Force plane. Pentagon support for the US engagement with the Sudan peace process in the form of staff and logistics is currently lacking, and may be similarly useful now.
7- Issue a warning: High-level American officials must clarify a realistic reality of American domestic policy: If Khartoum obstructs the peace process and causes its annihilation, the United States has no choice but to withdraw and exit the peace process and escalate its policy against the government, with uncertain results, taking into account the growing frustration in American electoral circles regarding Sudan. The SPLA must also be warned that if it is responsible for the collapse of the talks, it will find much less sympathy for its cause in Washington.
Bigger carrots and sticks to support the peace process
Beyond the leverage provided by the peace process itself, there are other key pressures and incentives at the disposal of the United States. Points of influence must be used only with the aim of reaching a comprehensive peace agreement, without squandering them for the sake of lesser goals or outbidding. In other words, normalizing relations, lifting economic sanctions, ending Sudan's isolation, support in the Bretton Wood institutions, stopping support for the opposition, and any other meaningful pressures should only happen when the two parties begin to implement a comprehensive peace agreement that they sign. Below is a review of the available pressures and incentives that, if their aspects are multiple, could have an impact on the calculations of the two warring parties.
It is vital that the United States maintain its pressure on Khartoum in the fight against terrorism. This culminated in providing greater influence over Khartoum's policies in the wake of the September 2001 attacks, as long as the Sudanese government remained uncertain about what the United States would do in pursuing its declared international war against terrorism. This is particularly salient with regard to the Pentagon's calculations. Short-term tactical cooperation by Khartoum should not be confused with strategic reorientation, which can only be secured by the kind of transformation accompanied by a comprehensive peace agreement that leads to reform of the central government.
Continued opposition to aid provided by international monetary institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) will make it difficult for the Sudanese government to rehabilitate its basic economy, which therefore makes this opposition an effective form of influence. The most radical is the huge outstanding debt, one of the largest outstanding debts in the world, which, if not addressed, will continue to be a fundamental obstacle to economic development and debt. The government needs to return to a full program with the International Monetary Fund to enter the program for the poorest indebted countries to qualify for a serious relief in borrowing. The votes of the United States on the International Monetary Fund Board prevented Sudan from going too far up the IMF ladder. The United States must continue to withhold assistance from Sudan in these institutions until a comprehensive peace agreement is reached. Ultimately, Sudan's economic improvement depends on ending the civil war, and there is nothing that can be done to amend that fact immaturely. Pressure on investors in the oil industry translates into indirect pressure on the Sudanese government, which relies heavily on the revenues it earns from this sector. A paragraph of the Sudan Peace Act thus provides a powerful point of leverage, because it could close key financial markets to oil companies operating in Sudan. Pressure on the Canadian company Talisman and other Western European companies that are considering launching new operations in Sudan is very important because these companies possess technologies that can quickly expand oil production. Only Talisman and Western European companies possess these technologies, and therefore Khartoum relies heavily on them to uncover potential reserves for developing the country's oil industry.
Secretary of State O'Neill recently reiterated the Bush administration's opposition to capital market sanctions, saying, "A better way to deal with Sudan is to say no one should trade with Sudan, period." If the Secretary speaks on behalf of the Administration, two actions by the United States will ensue. We must end the import exception for Sudanese gum arabic, which is Sudan's largest export to the United States. We must go to other countries that are currently doing business with Sudan and ask them to suspend their trade and investments, or call for the imposition of unilateral sanctions as the United States did. This includes European partners such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland, as well as other governments that invest heavily in and sell weapons to Sudan, such as China, Malaysia, and Russia.
More efforts could be made to investigate and highlight the issue of government corruption related to oil development. Shedding light on violations to expose them to the internal Sudanese public, which increases the extent of responsibility. The United States can express its support for the campaign recently announced by non-governmental organizations “Publish What You Pay,” which aims to have companies disclose their payments to developing countries.
Different forms and levels of assistance to the opposition/or civil society elements represent an important and effective lever. The continuum begins with democracy and peacebuilding assistance to the Sudan People's Liberation Army/National Democratic Rally or civil society groups. This, in itself, has a positive impact on the morale of those fighting for change in Sudan, and helps in the continuity of their struggles. Following the continuum, providing support for democratic administration in opposition-controlled areas that could indicate an alternative governance system that might be better. Further along the continuum, communications and transportation assistance can be provided to protect civilian populations in the south, east, and south-central areas (the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile) who are the subject of the government's most horrific military tactics such as displacement, slavery campaigns, and frequent aerial bombardments by Antenov aircraft and helicopter gunships.
Objecting to Sudan’s status in the World Trade Organization until a comprehensive peace agreement is reached may frustrate efforts aimed at reducing immature economic isolation.
More robust diplomatic efforts could be spent on reducing the unimpeded flow of weapons to the government of Sudan, which remains on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. Under the Wassenaar Agreement, Eastern European countries voluntarily agreed to maintain certain levels of dealing in arms sales. Arms sales to Sudan are absolutely not consistent with those levels, and it is necessary to resort to high-level and popular diplomacy by the United States to confront these sales, especially during the peace process. American officials at the highest levels are required to talk to China about the massive arms sales to Khartoum.
Maintaining international efforts to isolate Khartoum remains exciting for the government, meaning that every step it takes in international gatherings is a source of difficulty and controversy. Its defeat in its bid for a seat in the United Nations Security Council in 2000 was bitter for the government, and the unilateral US sanctions remain a stain and an economic obstacle.
B- Incentives for the government: The key incentives provided to Khartoum may include the following:
Sudan is looking forward to reducing its debts and improving its economy, as indicated by the government's continued implementation of structural adjustment programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund. Ending US opposition to financing from the Paris Club, borrowing from the International Monetary Fund, and World Bank loans to Sudan after reaching a peace agreement could be the greatest incentive that the United States can provide. This will open the door to entering the “Poorest Condemned Countries in the World” Forum, which is the key to unleashing the potential of Sudan’s economy.
Sudan was one of the largest recipients of non-emergency US foreign aid; Today he receives nothing. Implementing a future peace agreement will contribute to advancing a new era of improved US-Sudanese relations and make Sudan once again worthy of foreign assistance. Instead of uncoordinated bilateral assistance and promises of assistance to rebuild the post-war South, the United States should work with international donors to create a Sudan Reconstruction Trust Fund aimed at national reconstruction, benefiting both North and South.
Sudan wants a fully-fledged American embassy in Khartoum. An increased US embassy presence in Khartoum will allow the United States to impose better oversight on the government of Sudan, place personal diplomatic pressure on Khartoum to implement a comprehensive peace agreement, and reduce human rights violations.
Ending efforts to isolate Sudan in international forums is an important goal for the regime, whether that is removing the opposition to occupy a seat in the Security Council, removing the unilateral US sanctions and the description attached to Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, or opening the door to foreign aid and relief. The Government of Sudan seeks to grant legitimacy to itself and integrate into the international community.
A large-scale American investment partnership in developing the oil sector will be a fundamental enhancement of the state’s plans in the field of exploration and exploitation. Although Khartoum's efforts can continue without the involvement of an American company, American giants are ideal for Khartoum. Lifting unilateral sanctions after reaching a peace agreement will pave the way for US investment in the oil sector.
C- Pressure on the Sudan People’s Liberation Army: There are generally fewer levers of pressure on opposition groups compared to those levers on the government, but the levers directed at the Sudan People’s Liberation Army include the following: C- Pressure on the Sudan People's Liberation Army
A fundamental effort could be made to try to reduce the transfer of arms to the SPLA if it is perceived to be obstructing or damaging the peace process. This includes pressure on regional arms suppliers, in addition to resorting to the Wassenaar Agreement, as suggested above regarding pressure on the government.
Through the UN-supervised lifeline, the SPLA's relief arm, the Sudan Relief and Reconstruction Organization, is a member of a tripartite agreement between the government, the SPLA, and the United Nations. If the SPLA becomes an obstacle to a peaceful settlement of the conflict, the treatment of the SPLA/SAR under Lifeline must be reconsidered and curtailed.
All institution-building support provided to the SPLA, the NRA and its civil administration shall be suspended if the SPLA becomes an obstacle to a peace settlement.
D- Incentives for the Sudan People’s Liberation Army: There are also fewer incentives for the opposition, but the incentives for the SPLA are: D- Incentives for the Sudan People's Liberation Army
Promises of regional and international support to implement everything that might entail a comprehensive peace agreement are the most important incentives for the opposition. For example, an international monitoring force would be key to ensuring peace, external oversight of any agreements on the division of wealth would be necessary to ensure implementation, and human rights oversight would also be essential in the face of ongoing abuses or sanctions.
Establishing a basic agenda for reconstruction in the south, including governance, infrastructure, and social security networks, will be a key incentive for southern negotiators and - if widely implemented - an element of public responsibility that will push the SPLA to negotiate with confidence.
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Background painting: The ruins of the palace of the King of Sennar as painted by Caio in 1821